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Abstract 
Throughout history humanity has faced widespread suffering and death from the 
proliferation and use of various types of weapons. In an attempt to alleviate the threat to 
people and states from the global spread of these weapons, the international community 
has met in arms control negotiations countless times to restrain, reduce, or ban various 
weapons systems. In 1972, in recognition of the threat biological and toxin weapons 
posed humanity, the international community met in Geneva to sign the Convention on 
the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. However, this agreement has 
proven unable to prevent member states from possessing biological and toxin weapons. 
Serious inadequacies of the Convention include the ambiguous nature of the text of the 
Convention, the allowance of biological and toxin agents for research for defensive 
purposes, a lack of verification provisions and a lack of provisions in the text to regulate 
advances in the biotechnology field. 
This thesis analyses the weaknesses of the Convention that have led to its inability 
to eliminate biological and toxin weapons. It offers suggestions on how to strengthen the 
Convention with the ultimate objective of creating an international norm against the 
possession and use of biological and toxin weapons that will halt both member and rogue 
states from pursuing biological and toxin weapons capabilities. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Throughout history humanity has faced widespread destruction and death from 
the proliferation and use of weapons and weapons systems. From the virus to the nuclear 
weapon, these arms have the potential to cause global suffering, threatening not only 
national but also global security. To alleviate the threat of global proliferation, the 
international community has met in negotiations countless times to restrain, reduce, or 
ban various weapons systems. National and global security and stability are continuously 
threatened in the Twenty First Century by the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, including nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons. 
In 1972, in recognition of the threat biological and toxin agents posed to the 
international community, states from around the world met in Geneva to sign the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (hereafter, 
referred to as the Biological Weapons Convention, the Convention, or the BWC). The 
aim of the Convention was to ban member states from developing, producing, stockpiling 
or otherwise acquiring or retaining biological and toxin weapons. However, this 
agreement has been unable to prevent states from possessing, let alone using, these 
deadly weapons. This failure is a result of many factors, including the ambiguous nature 
of the Convention, the allowance of biological and toxin weapons for research for 
defensive purposes, a lack of verification controls, and a lack of provisions in the text to 
regulate advances in the biotechnology industry. 
The objectives of the Biological Weapons Convention have also not been met 
because of the very nature of the weapons themselves. Biological and toxin agents are 
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inexpensive, easy to make, and are capable of inflicting high numbers of death on target 
populations. States pursue offensive weapons programmes because biological and toxin 
agents are attractive weapons because of their killing capacity. 
This thesis will examine the weaknesses of the biological weapons regime that 
have led to its inability to prevent member states from possessing biological and toxin 
agents and will offer suggestions for strengthening the Convention. In the Convention ' s 
Preamble, which is not legally binding, the member states announced their desire to 
exclude completely the possibility of biological and toxin agents being used as weapons. 
However, the Convention's text, which is legally binding, only bans member states from 
developing, producing, stockpiling, acquiring and retaining (hereafter referred to as 
possession) biological and toxin agents that have no justification for protective, 
prophylactic (measures to guard against or to prevent disease) or other peaceful purposes. 
It does not actually ban the use of such weapons. It is my belief that member states 
should ban both the possession and use of these deadly weapons. 
Strengthening the Convention will not solve the problem of states possessing or 
desiring to possess these deadly weapons. Rather, through strengthening the Convention, 
a norm against the possession and use of biological and toxin agents could be created that 
will halt both member states and rogue states from pursuing biological and toxin weapons 
capabilities. A norm is a belief that is followed by all relevant actors in the international 
system. The process of norm building is an integral component of effective international 
regimes such as arms control agreements. If states come to the common belief that the 
possession and use of biological and toxin weapons is abhorrent in nature and that strict 
regulations need to be placed on state and non-state activity then in theory, a strengthened 
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norm on the ban of these weapons could be created. The definition of regime used in this 
thesis was taken from Young's The Effectiveness of International Environmental 
Regimes: Casual Connections and Behavioural Mechanisms. According to Young, 
"regimes are social institutions consisting of agreed upon principles, norms, rules, 
procedures, and programs that govern the interactions of actors in specific issue areas" 
(Young 1). In an effort to address the issue of effectiveness of international regimes 
scholars and policy makers alike have attempted to define the criteria that make 
international agreements effective, although no single set of criteria has been agreed 
upon. An effective regime is one that channels behaviour in such a way as to ameliorate 
substantially the problem that led to its creation (Young 1). If member states strengthen 
the Biological Weapons Convention the regime can facilitate acceptance of the norm of 
non-possession and non-use for other states in the international system. 
In order to review the Biological Weapons Convention at length, some key 
background on arms control should be discussed. 
I. Arms Control: What Is It? 
The efforts to control arms and the pursuit of disarmament have been inextricably 
linked to war and peace for hundreds of years. While international arms control and 
disarmament initiatives became part of the activities of states after the Peace of 
Westphalia in 1648, they have a long and rich history in both the national and 
international spheres. Historical records of the fifth century war between the Greek city-
states of Sparta and Athens indicate that they entered into arms control negotiations to 
limit the number of fortifications erected in both cities. The Catholic Church, in the 
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Middle Ages, issued canons (edicts) proscribing violence against clerics and women, and 
attempted to ban deadly weapons such as the crossbow (Rattray 1). After the Peace of 
Westphalia in 1648, which is credited with the creation of the modem state system, arms 
control and disarmament initiatives became a central focus of international negotiations 
among states attempting to promote national, and subsequently, global security 
objectives. The Hague Conventions in 1899 and 1907, in recognition of the potential for 
devastation in the international system from war, attempted to mitigate the destructive 
capabilities of future wars by banning, among other deadly weapons, asphyxiating gases 
from the repertoire of permissible weapons (Rattray 1). 
After the atrocities of the First World War, the 1925 Geneva Protocol to ban the 
use of chemical and biological weapons on the battlefield was created. However, as an 
international agreement it was a failure given states continued to pursue offensive 
chemical and biological weapons programs. In 1928, 63 countries signed the Kellogg-
Briand Pact, which attempted to outlaw war as a tool of national defence policy (Kegley 
and Wittkopf 21). With the onset of the Second World War, the dropping of the atomic 
bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States, and the nuclear arms race of the 
Cold War, international efforts of arms control and disarmament became an issue of 
importance for the entire international community. 
In Arms Control and Disarmament and the Canadian Approach to Global Order, 
Douglas A. Ross discusses four key functions of arms control initiatives. The first key 
function of arms control is to strengthen crisis stability by eliminating incentives for 
surprise attack and by reducing the risk of accidental or inadvertent warfare. The second 
factor discussed by Ross is that the arms control process builds confidence among states 
4 
by providing greater transparency in negotiations and establishing confidence building 
measures. Thirdly, Ross believes that arms race stability will be strengthened through 
reducing "the financial cost of military rivalry in peacetime through agreed cuts in 
weaponry and joint decisions to forego some areas of technical and scientific 
competition" (Ross 254). Finally, the arms control and disarmament process acts to 
constrain the level of violence that would occur in a war through reducing numbers and 
eliminating categories of weapons (Ross 254 ). As will be discussed throughout this 
thesis, these four key functions can be related to the international efforts to restrain, 
reduce and ban states from possessing biological and toxin weapons. 
Major arms control initiatives have focused on the non-proliferation of a myriad 
of weapons and the constraining of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, with 
a special focus during the Cold War period on nuclear weapons because their killing 
capacity and potential for world wide destruction is unparalleled. There are two types of 
proliferation: horizontal proliferation and vertical proliferation. Vertical proliferation 
occurs when states increase their existing arsenals. Horizontal proliferation occurs when 
there is an increase in the number of states that possess the specified weapon. 
Arms control has been a difficult process. States maintain military capabilities 
because they want to be able to counter the weapons of enemy states. A state will pursue 
weapons development if it is militarily weaker than other states and wants to pull even, or 
if it is ahead of other states and wants to remain ahead. If states believe it is in their best 
interest to pursue a course of arms and weapons build-up, they may engage in weapons 
proliferation because they want to protect their national security or expand their 
influence. According to Barry Buzan, security is the "pursuit of freedom from threat and 
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the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their 
functional integrity against forces of change which they see as hostile. The bottom line of 
security is survival" (Buzan 238). Similarly, Kegley and Wittkopf write that national 
security is "a country's psychological freedom from fear of foreign attack" (Kegley and 
Wittkopf 371). Consisting with these definitions, international security has traditionally 
been viewed as the security of states. For the purpose of this thesis, however, the term 
global security will be used because biological and toxin weapons affect not only states 
but also individuals and the international system as a whole. Global security is the 
preservation of individuals, states, and the international system from threat, hostile forces 
and attacks. 
II. Theory of Arms and Arms Control 
A common theme in international relations theorising is that the international 
system is anarchic in nature. According to Hedley Bull (1994), "whereas men within each 
state are subject to a common government, sovereign states in their mutual relations are 
not" (Bull 136). The international system is anarchic in the sense that there is no 
overarching body or world government that regulates the actions among states. The 
absence of a governing authority in the international system places the responsibility for 
national and global security on each state within the system. In a self-help system, states 
rely upon their military strength to protect them from attack by an aggressor state. 
Military might, or perceptions of military might, are indicators both of power and 
strength. Believing that the system is anarchic, states build up weaponry to protect their 
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national security. "Since military strength is the obvious measure of a nation's power, its 
demonstration serves to impress the others with that nation's power" (Morgenthau 90). 
When states attempt to protect their national security or expand their influence 
through pursuing a course of arms build-up and weapons proliferation, other states can 
perceive these actions as potentially aggressive and as a threat to their own national 
security. Thus, the latter perceive a need to build up their own military capabilities. This 
security dilemma creates a vicious cycle when states believe that the only route to 
achieving national security is through an arms build-up. The security of one state 
ultimately leads to the insecurity of another state, resulting in an arms race. 
Given the belief that the system is anarchic in nature, and given the belief that 
through pursuing a course of weapons build-up states can protect their national security 
from a threat or a perceived threat, even a state that does not have the intention of 
attacking other states will desire to maintain a military capability for defensive purposes. 
In addition to maintaining weapons for defensive purposes, a state may want also to 
preserve the ability to retaliate offensively against an attack from an aggressor state. Both 
a defensive capability and the ability to retaliate offensively against an attack by an 
enemy can serve to deter other states from aggressive action. Deterrence is "a preventive 
strategy designed to dissuade an adversary from doing what it would otherwise do" 
(Kegley and Wittkopf 600). Essentially, states will be deterred from using their weapons 
against another state by the threat of retaliation or successful defence. Proponents of this 
logic would argue that weapons systems, including weapons of mass destruction, act to 
ensure peace in the system or, in the event of war, to ensure stability. Arms control and 
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disarmament initiatives, on the other hand, are an attempt to control and/or reduce these 
weapons and weapons programmes to decrease the possibility of violence and war. 
There are two classic opposing views on arms control. One belief, which is based 
on the realist perspective, asserts that weapons are integral to ensuring peace and stability 
in the international system. In summary, the basic tenets of realism are that (a) states are 
the most important actors in the international system; (b) the international system is 
anarchic in nature because there is no controlling or governing body that presides over 
the system; (c) the primary obligation of a state is to ensure its own national security and; 
(d) states are rational unified actors. Thus, states need to arm themselves to deter would-
be aggressors and to ensure their security. Realists therefore, oppose and are very 
cautious about the reduction of weapons from existing arsenals. The realist view on arms 
control is that it is conflicting interests, not weapons, which are the causes of war. 
The opposing point of view, which can be called the idealist view, centres on the 
belief that the role of arms in the international system is basically negative. The tenets of 
idealism include the belief that international cooperation is an integral component in 
ensuring peace and security in the system. Furthermore, idealists believe that states are 
not the only important actors in the international system, but that individuals and 
coalitions of people can effect change in the system. If states have too many weapons and 
arms, then the system will become unstable because states will use the weapons against 
one another under the guise of protecting national security (Waltz 371). Proponents of 
this view would argue that arms and weapons systems should be controlled in order to 
reduce tensions, increase stability, and make less likely their use in times of conflict and 
war. The broader term, disarmament, is the process of controlling, reducing or 
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eliminating weapons and weapons systems either unilaterally or through multilateral 
agreements (Kegley and Wittkopf 600). 
I would support the idealist view that if states have certain weapons then they will 
more likely be used as instruments of war. I also understand the realist assumption that it 
is conflicting interests, not weapons, which are the causes of war. Disarmament/ arms 
control agreements help to create an international norm against the possession and use of 
weapons systems. Proponents of strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention do 
not subscribe to the belief that one's possession of these weapons necessarily will deter 
others from their use. Biological and toxin weapons are becoming a greater threat 
because they are coming increasingly within the reach of rogue states and non-state 
terrorist organisations that could use them both for revenge and their own political 
causes. Rogue states and terrorist organisations may well hold a different vision of 
security than that held by most other actors. They may use biological and toxin agents to 
further their political agendas regardless of the threat posed to global security and 
regardless of the threat of retaliation. The more biological and toxin weapons that exist in 
the system, the greater likelihood that rogue states and terrorist groups will acquire and 
use them to inflict massive casualties and serve their particular objectives (Art 479). 
Despite their relatively low profile, biological weapons are a threat that concerns 
many individuals outside the ranks of weapons experts and government agencies. A 
public opinion poll conducted for the Canadian Department of National Defence in 1999 
shows that the second ranked concern of Canadians in regards to threats against national 
security was the spread of biological and chemical weapons (DND 21). Fully 65% of 
respondents were concerned or very concerned about the spread of biological and 
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chemical weapons, ranking it above other more topical issues such as terrorism, ethnic 
violence and religious extremists. 1 At the Fifth Review Conference of the Biological 
Weapons Convention in 2001, it will be very important for the member states to 
strengthen the Convention in order to halt the growth of offensive weapons programmes 
and to limit the threat of biological attack from rogue states. While strengthening the 
Convention will not itself halt the proliferation of these weapons, it will help to create an 
international norm against the possession and use of biological and toxin agents as 
weapons. 
States have legitimate concerns over national defence and security. According to 
E. H. Carr, "[e]very solution of the problem of political change, whether national or 
international, must be based on a compromise between morality and power" (Carr 209). 
Those who subscribe to the realist vision of international relations will have to make such 
a compromise in order to strengthen the Convention. 
This thesis will thus be a policy analysis of the Biological Weapons Convention 
and will offer a set of proposals on how to strengthen the Convention. Even if it is 
unlikely that the Convention will be strengthened in the near future, it is essential that the 
international community move toward ensuring that biological and toxin weapons are not 
maintained or used as weapons of mass destruction. 
1 The close-ended question asked on the Department of National Defence survey was "I am going to read 
you a list of issues facing Canadians. On a scale of 1-5 (5 being very concerned and 1 being not concerned 
at all) can you tell me how serious a concern each issue is to the well being of Canada." 
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If the Biological Weapons Convention is not strengthened, and restrictions are not 
placed on permissible activity, both member states and non-members will likely continue 
to produce and stockpile offensive biological and toxin weapons. Some may do this 
because they want to be able to use these weapons offensively. Others will do so because 
they want to be able to defend themselves or to retaliate in case of an attack against them 
using biological weapons. In a worst case scenario an attack with a biological or toxin 
agent may prompt a target state and allies into retaliatory action that could start a 
biological war with catastrophic results. 
III. Thesis Outline 
Chapter Two will provide an overview of biological weapons, discussing what 
biological and toxin agents are and why they are used as weapons. It will provide a brief 
history of their use as an instrument of war. It is important to understand the nature of 
these agents in order to understand why states pursue offensive biological and toxin 
weapons capabilities. This chapter will examine the pursuit of such capabilities by states 
up until 1972, looking specifically at the German, Japanese and American offensive 
weapons programmes. Chapter Two will also examine the international community's 
attempts to prohibit the possession of biological and toxin weapons, looking specifically 
at the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. 
Chapter Three provides an overview of the contemporary Soviet and Iraqi 
offensive biological and toxin weapons programmes and examines the implications that 
the possession of offensive biological weapons by the Soviet Union and Iraq have for the 
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Biological Weapons Convention. These two case studies will show how member states 
have reneged upon their obligations not to pursue offensive weapons capabilities. 
Chapter Four will look at the problems of the Biological Weapons Convention, 
looking specifically at the ambiguous nature of the Convention, the allowance of research 
for defensive purposes, the lack of verification controls in the text of the Convention and 
the lack of provisions in the text to regulate advances in biotechnology industry. This 
analysis of the weaknesses of the Convention will highlight what components of the 
Convention need to be strengthened in order to create an international norm against the 
possession and use of these deadly weapons. 
Chapter Five examines international efforts to strengthen the Convention through 
discussing the four Review Conferences, held in 1981, 1986, 1991 and 1996. The 
inability of the biological weapons regime to ban possession of biological and toxin 
weapons is illustrative of the greater difficulties surrounding arms control agreements. 
Through revealing the efforts of the international community we can better understand 
the constraints on strengthening the Convention. 
Chapter Six proceeds from the weaknesses of the Biological Weapons Convention 
examined in Chapter Five and provides suggestions for strengthening the BWC. These 
are proposals that might be considered by the international community and need to be 
evaluated. The concluding chapter will review the arguments made and will examine the 
future of the Convention. 
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Chapter 2: An Overview of Biological Weapons and the Convention 
I. Introduction 
What are biological and toxin agents? Why have they been used as instruments of 
war and terrorism? What have been the historical uses of biological and toxin weapons? 
What are some of the international efforts to control them? This chapter will answer these 
important questions. The history of the use of biological and toxin weapons demonstrates 
how they threaten global security and thus why they need to be controlled. 
II. Biological and Toxin Agents 
Biological, also known as bacteriological, weapons are derived from living 
organisms. The infectious nature of the living organisms can be manipulated and the 
organisms are used because they can multiply in plant, animal, and human organisms, 
causing sickness, injury and even death in target populations or species. Most biological 
agents are odourless and tasteless and can be easily disguised due to their similarity to the 
original bacteria from which they are derived. Moreover, the dual-use nature of the 
agents, and of the equipment and materials used to study them, makes it difficult to 
distinguish between weapons and non-weapons research. Duality can be defined as the 
agents, equipment and materials that can be used for both defensive and offensive 
programmes. The original biological pathogens are easily obtained, either from natural 
settings like soil, plants, animals and humans, or from medical research or 
pharmaceutical agencies. Since they are living micro-organisms, most biological agents 
have the ability to divide every twenty minutes, multiplying so quickly that a single 
bacterium can become over ten billion bacteria in less than ten hours, making them a 
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potent potential weapon (Cole 4). The biological agents that have been used in offensive 
weapons programmes can be placed into five groups: bacteria, viruses, ricketssiae, fungi 
and toxins. Examples of bacteria include Bacillus anthracis which causes anthrax, 
Shigella dysenteriae which causes bacillary dysentery and Brucella suis which causes 
brucellosis (Prescott, Harley and Klein 664). Examples of viruses include Rift Valley 
Fever, influenza and dengue fever (Norris and Fowler 4). Ricketssial diseases include 
Rickettsia prowazekii which causes epidemic typhus, Rickettsia rickettsii which causes 
Rocky Mountain spotted fever, and Coxiellia bumetii which causes Q fever (Prescott, 
Harley and Klein 780). Fungi examples include Histoplasma capsulatum which causes 
histoplasmosis and Coccidiodes immitis which causes San Joaquin fever (Norris and 
Fowler 4). 
Like biological weapons, toxin weapons are agents that disseminate poisonous 
substances derived from living organisms that can cause widespread sickness, injury and 
even death in animals and humans. However, unlike biological weapons, toxin weapons 
are inanimate and therefore can not multiply or reproduce in the target population. Toxin 
agents are generally more stable than biological agents because they are not living. Yet, 
once disseminated into a target population, they can cause severe sickness and death in a 
limited time frame anywhere from minutes to hours. The 1972 Biological Weapons 
Convention includes toxins under prohibited agents because the creation of toxin 
weapons requires facilities and equipment similar in nature to those required for the 
creation of biological weapons. Examples of toxins that can be used as weapons of mass 
destruction are Aspergillus flavus which causes Aflatoxins, Ricin and Shigatoxin which 
produces E. coli (Ferguson 89). 
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Biological and toxin weapons can be disseminated into target populations in 
several different ways. Technical means of delivery include the use of bombs, artillery 
shells, rockets and sprays. The use of large delivery systems, such as a bomb or rocket, 
increases the difficulty of a successful attack because the explosions involved may kill 
the living organism. Non-technical and cheaper modes of dissemination into the target 
population, usually through aerosol methods, include using animal vectors (eg. fleas and 
mosquitos), crop dusters used for agricultural spraying purposes, backpack sprayers and 
even purse-sized atomisers (Danzig and Berkowsky 10). 
The success of the delivery of a biological agent, whether through the air, water, 
or other means, has also traditionally been dependent upon meteorological conditions. 
The virulence of a biological agent disseminated into the air, for example, is dependent 
upon wind intensity, heat, cold, rain and humidity, making the success rate an unknown 
variable. However, with the advent of biotechnology, an agent can be manipulated to 
ensure that successful delivery is less dependent upon meteorological conditions. 
III. Biological Agents as Weapons 
Biological and toxin weapons have been labelled as the poor man's atom bomb 
because they are inexpensive weapons to create, in comparison to nuclear weapons and 
other types of weapons systems. Unlike other weapons of mass destruction biological 
and toxin agents are readily accessible. Strains of biological and toxin agents can be 
purchased from pharmaceutical companies and microbial culture supply companies under 
the guise of research. Unlike other weapons of mass destruction which require expensive 
and elaborate equipment and facilities to create, biological and toxin weapons can be 
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easily manufactured in almost any environment from a state of the art laboratory to a 
basement of someone's home. An individual with basic biology knowledge and simple 
laboratory equipment, including a fermenter, a breathing apparatus, and protective 
clothing, can create a biological weapon from a recipe available on the Internet. An 
example of biological terrorism occurred in 1992. Four extremists from an American 
organisation called the Minnesota Patriots Council extracted ricin (an extremely lethal 
toxin agent) from castor oil beans. The extremists had conspired to assassinate law 
officials but were arrested before they could use the toxin weapon (Tucker 297). In 1998, 
three members of an American right wing secessionist group were arrested after they 
conspired to "assassinate President Bill Clinton and other senior federal officials by using 
a crude air-gun fashioned from a Bic lighter to fire cactus thorns coated with biological 
agents causing anthrax, botulism, or rabies" (Tucker 298). Crude as the methods were, 
the extremists' attack could have been successful. In 1995, a Japanese extremist group 
known as Aum Shinrikyo released sarin nerve gas in a Tokyo subway (Danzig and 
Berkowsky 11). The Aum Shinrikyo cult had experimented with anthrax, botulism and 
ebola, but had never achieved a successful delivery with any of its biological weapons. 
Biological agents can be strategic weapons for states interested in developing 
weapons of mass destruction capability. The development of a biological and toxin 
offensive weapons programme would be attractive to states unable to develop or produce 
nuclear weapons capabilities. The potentially large number of deaths that could result 
from a single attack on a human population make biological weapons very appealing 
weapons for some states in comparison to chemical weapons. A study conducted by the 
Office of Technology Assessment in the United States estimated that 1000 kg of sarin 
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nerve gas, a chemical weapon, released from an aeroplane in the atmosphere could kill up 
to eight thousand people. A millionth of a gram of Bacillus anthracis (hereafter referred 
to as anthrax) can constitute a lethal dose for one human target. A release of 100 kg (two 
hundred and twenty pounds) of anthrax bacteria, a common biological weapon developed 
in both the Russian Federation and Iraq, could result in three million deaths (Cole 7). 
As was discussed in Chapter One, actors in the international system retain 
biological weapons research capabilities for a variety of reasons. Due to advances in the 
biotechnology industry that allow for the genetic engineering of microorganisms, some 
states maintain research capabilities so that they can defend against an attack with a 
genetically engineered or novel agent (the term applied to newly developed or created 
agents). Through maintaining a weapons research programme states also preserve the 
ability to retaliate with biological weapons against such an attack. As well, states with 
defensive capabilities could easily transfer their programme into an offensive one with 
minimal effort. 
IV. The Historical Use of Biological Weapons 
Biological agents have been used as weapons of war for hundreds of years 
because of their potential to cause high casualty rates in target populations. Corpses 
contaminated with smallpox, the plague, and other lethal infections have often been used 
in war. Soldiers would throw diseased corpses over the walls of the city that they were 
attacking or defending. For example, in 1346, during the siege of Kaffa (Ukraine) by 
invading Tatar forces , the Kaffa soldiers threw corpses of their deceased over the walls of 
their city to infect the invading forces with a plague epidemic (Christopher et al. 18). 
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Many states around the world have pursued offensive biological weapons 
programmes, including the Soviet Union, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the 
United States and Japan. In this section I will focus on only the German, Japanese and 
American programmes as examples of the enormous efforts many states undertook to 
pursue biological weapons programmes prior to signing of the 1972 Biological Weapons 
Convention. Information on their offensive weapons programmes is vast. 
Biological and chemical agents were used during both world wars in the 
Twentieth Century. During the First World War both Germany and the United States 
utilised biological weapons to target animal populations. Germany is suspected of 
developing an extensive offensive biological weapons programme that included 
developing anthrax. The German programme featured covert operations "in neutral 
trading partners of the Allies to infect livestock and contaminate animal feed to be 
exported to Allied forces" (Christopher et al. 19). By infecting the livestock and animal 
feed with biological agents, it would be possible for Germany to gain a military 
advantage if the target populations became infected. 
Interested in creating a biological weapon for use in warfare, Japanese forces 
conducted an extensive offensive biological weapons programme from 1932 until 1945 in 
occupied Manchuria (China). In Manchuria, the Japanese forces conducted research on 
anthrax, Vibrio cholerae (a bacteria causing cholera), Yersinia pestis (a bacterium that 
causes the Black Death and is carried by rodents and transmitted by fleas), salmonella, 
typhoid and paratyphoid fevers. Consisting of one hundred and fifty buildings, five 
satellite camps, and over 3,000 scientists and technicians, Unit 731 at Ping Fan was the 
centre of an extensive biological weapons programme (Norris and Fowler 29). The 
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Japanese scientists and soldiers used prisoners of war as experimental subjects, infecting 
them with biological agents to test dissemination patterns and times, infection rates and 
lethality. Research indicates that biological weapons manufactured in Unit 731, and other 
bases in Changchun and Nanking, were used against China during the Second World 
War. In the Ping Fan region of China, the Japanese forces were able to produce 500 
million plague-infected fleas per year (Norris and Fowler 29). 
In 1942, the United States began its offensive biological weapons programme 
under the War Reserve Service, which included research and development facilities at 
Fort Detrick in Maryland, testing sites at the Army's Dugway Proving Ground in Utah, 
and a large production facility at Pine Bluff, Arkansas (Wright 35). The aim of the 
American programme was to develop biological weapons for offensive purposes against 
enemy countries, as well as to defend against attacks from states, like Japan, with 
offensive biological weapons programmes. Like the Japanese counterpart, the American 
programme was developed during the Second World War and parallels the A-Bomb 
development. It is highly possible that the American forces knew of the Japanese 
offensive biological weapons programme and thus pursued an offensive weapons 
programme in an effort to protect American national security. American scientists 
experimented with and researched anthrax and undulant fever, analysing their use as 
weapons of mass destruction. During World War II, the offensive American biological 
weapons programme produced 5,000 bombs filled with the anthrax bacteria at Fort 
Detrick (Christopher et al. 22). While the Americans have never admitted that they have 
used biological agents in warfare, they were accused by the Soviet Union, the People's 
Republic of China, and North Korea of using biological agents against the North Koreans 
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during the Korean War from 1950-1953. However, enough evidence was never gathered 
to prove misconduct by the United States. American President Nixon, through an 
Executive Order in 1969, terminated the American offensive biological weapons 
programme (Kadlec et al. 98). 
Up until 1972, other states, including the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, 
pursued offensive biological weapons programmes unhindered. In recognition of the 
threat posed by the use of these weapons, and as part of a larger shift towards detente 
during this era, these states either agreed to destroy or convert their offensive biological 
weapons programmes into defensive ones through signing the 1972 Convention. Given 
that these offensive weapons programmes have existed, it is essential to look at the matter 
of control of these weapons. 
V. The Origins of the Biological Weapons Convention 
In recognition of the danger posed by biological agents, the international 
community has, for over a century, attempted to restrain, control, and halt the use of these 
deadly weapons. The need to create a prohibition against the possession and use of 
biological and toxin agents has become ever more urgent with the emergence of new 
infectious diseases, like ebola, marburg and hanta virus, and the re-emergence of old 
ones, including the bubonic and pneumonic plague, tuberculosis and influenza. The 
potential for rogue states to adapt these deadly biological agents for use in warfare 
exacerbates the threat. 
The origins of the 1972 BWC can be traced back as far as 1899 and 1907 when 
the international community at the two Hague International Peace Conferences called for 
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the prohibition of the use of poisons during war time. The declarations signed by the 
states participating in the conferences were a recognition of the threat to combatants and 
non-combatants alike from the use of chemical and biological agents on the battlefield 
and are an example of the long-term efforts that have been undertaken to strengthen 
biological weapons control. During the First World War, however, warring forces used 
chlorine and mustard gases on the battlefield. In 1925 the Allied forces formalised the 
pre-war declarations signed at the two Hague International Peace Conferences in an 
attempt to strengthen the norm against the use of biological agents as weapons. 
On 17 June 1925, the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of 
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare was 
signed in Geneva. As a biological weapons agreement, the 1925 Geneva Protocol was 
grossly inadequate. As per Ross's four key functions of arms control initiatives, the 
Protocol did not build confidence among states by providing greater transparency in 
negotiations, nor did it strengthen arms race stability or eliminate any types of weapons. 
Biological and toxin agents were not mentioned in the Preamble and were mentioned 
only briefly in the text of the Protocol. The states involved were more interested in 
controlling the use of chemical weapons. In part this was because in the First World War 
chemical agents, rather than biological and toxin agents, were used as weapons on the 
battlefield. The states that signed the Protocol also only agreed to prohibit the use of 
chemical and biological agents in time of war rather than to ban their possession (Kadlec 
et al. 97). 
Other weaknesses of the Protocol included its failure to include provisions for 
monitoring and verifying state compliance. These allow for greater transparency and 
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provide member states with information on the activities of others. Effective verification 
involves a series of measures such as declarations of activities, visits to facilities, or other 
information that would yield accurate and unambiguous data about the nature of activities 
of potential concern (Kadlec et al. 100). The Geneva Protocol also failed to establish a 
consensus as to the range of toxic agents that should be covered by the Protocol. This 
absence of consensus allowed states to develop their own interpretations of their legal 
obligations under the Protocol, thereby allowing them to produce agents that they thought 
most useful. Momentum towards establishing an international prohibition against the 
possession and use of biological and toxin weapons tapered off after the signing of the 
Protocol and the advent of the Second World War. States continued to pursue offensive 
weapons capabilities without further promoting a ban on their possession under 1969 
when the political climate changed, partly as a result of detente. 
In 1969, a group of like-minded states, which included Canada and the United 
Kingdom, expressed support for a convention that would ban biological and toxin agents 
as weapons of mass destruction. In light of the technical and political difficulties involved 
in creating an arms control agreement that included both chemical and biological 
weapons (given they involve different types of agents and delivery systems), negotiations 
began for two separate arms control treaties. On 10 April1972, in London, Moscow and 
Washington, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction 
was signed. On 26 March 1975, it entered into force with 46 ratifications. By January 1, 
2000, 144 states had ratified the Convention (SIPRI-Ratification to the BTWC 1) (See 
Appendix I). 
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The drafters of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention recognised the 
limitations of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. They sought a new treaty to ban the possession 
of biological and toxin agents as weapons, although allowed work on such weapons for 
protective, prophylactic or other peaceful purposes. Member states agreed to "prohibit 
and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of 
biological or toxin weapons and the means to deliver them for hostile purposes" (Cole 
11). The Convention became the first international arms control agreement since the 
Second World War to ban an entire class of offensive weapons (Kadlec et al. 99). The 
Preamble to the BWC promotes a norm of non-use of biological weapons, stating that the 
use of biological agents as weapons of war would be "repugnant to the conscience of 
mankind and that no effort should be spared to minimize this risk" (Wright 371). 
However, the text of the Convention does not ban the actual use of these weapons. 
The text of the Convention has fifteen Articles that set out the parameters of 
permissible state activity (See Appendix II). Article 1 of the Convention states that 
parties to the Convention: 
undertake never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or 
otherwise acquire or retain: 1. Microbial or other biological agents, or 
toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in 
quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other 
peaceful purposes; 2. Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed 
to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict 
(Wright 371). 
The second Article commits each party to the Convention to undertake to destroy 
or to divert to peaceful purposes within nine months of entry into force of the Convention 
"all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of 
the Convention, which are in its possession or under its jurisdiction or control" (Wright 
23 
372). Article III states that parties are not allowed to transfer or help other states in the 
manufacture or acquisition of any of the banned agents. Article IV discusses 
constitutional measures for national implementation of the Convention. Article V 
promotes consultation and cooperation among member states while Article VI makes 
special provisions for lodging complaints with the United Nations Security Council 
regarding any party suspected of breaching their obligations, and Article VII makes 
provisions for assistance for states exposed to danger from biological and toxin weapons. 
Article VIII simply states that the Convention shall not detract from the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol. Article IX makes special mention of chemical weapons: "Each State Party to 
this Convention affirms the recognized objective of prohibition of chemical weapons and, 
to this end, undertakes to continue negotiations in good faith .. . " (Wright 373). Article X 
promotes the sharing of equipment, materials, scientific and technological information for 
peaceful purposes. Article XI provides for amendments to the Convention and Article XII 
sets forth provisions for review conferences to be held every five years. Article xm is the 
usual "exit clause" and provides the following: 
Each State Party to this Convention shall in exercising its national 
sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Convention if it decides 
that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the Convention, 
have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country (Wright 375). 
Each member state that exercises this option must notify the United Nations Security 
Council three months in advance. Other articles (XIV and XV) discuss provisions for 
signature of states before and after entry into force, as well as accession and ratifications, 
and for copies of the Convention deposited in the archives of Depository Governments 
(countries where the Convention was signed) (Wright 376). 
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Since the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention entered into force, the harsh 
reality is that the number of states with offensive biological weapons programmes may 
have more than doubled, as expressed by the American point of view. "Overall the 
United States believes that twice as many countries now have or are actively pursuing 
offensive biological weapons capabilities as when the Convention went into force" 
(Pearson and Chevrier 113). While the list of states possessing biological weapons is 
disputed, mainly by the states accused of possessing them, it is generally believed that 
Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Taiwan and the Soviet Union have illegal 
biological and toxin weapons (Chevrier and Smithson 74). American Secretary of 
Defense, WilliamS. Cohen, concurs with Pearson and Chevrier and identifies North 
Korea, Libya, Syria, Iran and Iraq as possessing biological and toxin weapons (Cohen xi). 
VI. Conclusion 
This brief history of the creation and use of biological and toxin agents and 
weapons and discussion of what elements make these weapons appealing to states, 
demonstrates why biological and toxin weapons have been difficult to restrain, reduce 
and ban. After poisonous gases were used on the battlefield in the First World War the 
international community recognised the potential for devastation these weapons had. In 
the Second World War states actively pursued offensive biological weapons programmes, 
ultimately leading to an arms spiral. In 1972, states negotiated the Biological Weapons 
Convention in an attempt to ban the possession of biological and toxin agents that had no 
justification for peaceful, prophylactic or other protective purposes from states repertoires 
of weapons. The inability of the Biological Weapons Convention to meet its objectives is 
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illustrative of a greater problem in arms control. States are reluctant to conclude arms 
control agreements that limit their military capabilities or spheres of action. 
The next chapter will describe and analyse two cases where Convention member 
states pursued offensive weapons programmes. 
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Chapter Three: The Soviet and Iraqi Biological Weapons Programmes 
I. Introduction 
This Chapter introduces two cases where states in the international system have 
pursued offensive biological weapons programmes and examines the impact the 
development of offensive biological and toxin weapons by the Soviet Union and Iraq has 
had on the Biological Weapons Convention. The importance of examining the Soviet and 
Iraqi programmes is that it demonstrates that states in the international system will 
engage in illegal weapons activity if they believe that such weapons development will 
protect their national security or will expand their influence. 
II. The History of the Soviet Biological Weapons Programme 
Since the early 1980s, the international community has suspected that the Soviet 
Union maintained an extensive offensive biological and toxin weapons programme 
during the 1970s and 1980s even though it was a proponent of the Biological Weapons 
Convention when it was signed in 1972. As a signatory the Soviet Union agreed not to 
produce, stockpile, acquire or retain biological and toxin agents other than for research 
for defensive purposes. During the first three Review Conferences (in 1981, 1986 and 
1991), the Soviet Union hid its offensive weapons programme from the international 
community, claiming it was only conducting research for defensive purposes. Research is 
permitted under the terms of the BWC. "[T]he Convention neither proscribes biological 
weapons research nor the possession of quantities (not otherwise specified) of biological 
agents for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. This has been interpreted 
as allowing research for defensive studies" (King and Strauss 120). Permissible research 
includes activity that is undertaken to protect combatant troops and civilians from a 
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biological and toxin weapon attack. The relevant provisions of the BWC will be 
discussed at greater length in Chapter Four. 
Even after Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin quietly admitted in 1992 
that the Soviet Union had conducted offensive weapons studies, other Russian officials 
denied this. In 1996, at the Fourth Review Conference, Grigory Berdennikov, head of the 
Russian delegation, stated that "Russia has ... never developed, produced, accumulated, 
or stored biological weapons" (Alibek 257). Other leading officials in the Russian 
Federation have contradicted former President Yeltsin's statement. However, as will be 
discussed in this chapter, proof of the illegal Soviet offensive weapons programme can be 
clearly found in the admission by Boris Yeltsin in 1992 that the Soviet Union had 
violated the Biological Weapons Convention by developing offensive biological weapons 
capabilities, scientific evidence from the anthrax accident in Sverdlovsk, and statements 
from high ranking senior defectors from the Soviet biological weapons programme. 
Much information about the Soviet offensive biological weapons programme 
comes from a defector to the United States, Kanatjan Alibekov (Ken Alibek). From 1988-
1992, Alibek was the First Deputy Chief of Biopreparat, the Soviet state pharmaceutical 
agency which was mandated with developing and producing biological and toxin 
weapons from the most lethal viruses, bacteria and toxins in the world. According to 
Alibek, the Soviet offensive biological weapons programme' s roots can be traced back to 
an epidemic of typhus which caused thousands of deaths in 1918-1921 during the Civil 
War (Alibek 32). After the Civil War ended in Russia in 1921 with a victory by the 
Communist Party, members of the state apparatus recognised the potential that existed in 
typhus to be harnessed as a biological weapon. The governing Revolutionary Military 
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Council signed a secret decree in 1928 that ordered the rickettsial disease typhus carried 
by louse and fleas be transformed into a weapon that could be used on the battlefield 
(Alibek 33). 
After the first decree to study typhus was acted upon, the Soviet biological 
weapons programme expanded to include many other biological agents. During the 
Second World War the Soviet weapons programme conducted research on Yersina pestis 
(the bacterium causing the plague), Francisella tularensis (the bacterium causing 
tularaemia) and Q fever. In 1945, the Soviet forces captured the Japanese Unit 731 in 
occupied Manchuria, allowing them access to deadly illnesses studied by the Japanese 
during the Second World War, including anthrax and the ones causing dysentery and 
cholera (Alibek 36). After the death of Stalin in 1953, the offensive biological weapons 
programme came under the control of the Fifteenth Directorate of the Red Army, which 
quickly broadened its scope and size. 
When the Soviet Union signed the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention it was in 
the process of modernising the existing biological weapons programme, experimenting 
with genetic engineering to create deadly pathogens that were not only more lethal, but 
also resistant to antibiotics and vaccines (Alibek 41). The Soviet biological weapons 
programme conducted studies in the 1970s and 1980s of anthrax, tularaemia and even 
hemorrhagic fevers including the deadly filoviruses ebola and marburg. It was not until 
1979 that information on the extent of the Soviet biological weapons programme first 
came to light with the accidental release of anthrax in Sverdlovsk. 
In late March or early April 1979 in Sverdlovsk, (the exact date is unknown), a 
worker at the secret anthrax drying plant at Compound 19 failed to replace a clogged 
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filter that he had removed from the drying machines ' exhaust pipes. By the time that this 
error had been noticed, thousands of airborne microscopic anthrax spores had been 
released into the surrounding countryside. The incident resulted in an estimated 64 deaths 
and a total of close to a hundred infections (Guillemin ix). Anthrax, which is an acute 
bacterial disease affecting the skin, intestinal tract and pulmonary system, has three 
clinical manifestations in humans. These are cutaneous, gastrointestinal and inhalational 
(Chin 20). Anthrax can be spread by contact with the tissues of infected animals, a bite 
from flies that had fed on infected animals, aerosol inhalation from dried hides or by 
contact with contaminated soil (Chin 21). Authorities in Sverdlovsk claimed that the 
outbreak of the disease was the result of individuals eating contaminated meat. They 
argued that the infected individuals had gastrointestinal anthrax, but could not explain 
their lesions and skin irritations, of a sort that often appear on infected individuals from 
aerosol inhalation of anthrax (Meselson et al. 193). The Soviet authorities were at the 
time obviously very concerned about the truth of the Sverdlovsk accident being found 
out. 
In 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin confirmed suspicions that the Soviet 
Union had participated in an offensive bio-weapons programme and admitted to world 
leaders that the incident in Sverdlovsk was the result of an accident at a military 
biological weapons facility (Kadlec et al. 104). Biopreparat employees and government 
officials have confirmed Yeltsin's statement and admitted that the Soviet Union had 
conducted an elaborate cover-up, hiding at least six research labs, five production 
facilities and fifteen thousand Biopreparat employees (Christopher et al. 31). After his 
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admission in 1992, President Yeltsin, through a Presidential Decree, ordered the 
dismantling of the Soviet offensive biological weapons programme (Tucker 304). 
The status of the successor Russian Federation's biological weapons programme 
remains unknown. Governmental officials maintain that the offensive programme has 
been dismantled, while defectors, including Alibek, maintain that it is more likely that 
work on offensive weapons continues. The existence of the Soviet, and perhaps Russian, 
offensive biological weapons programme has serious implications for the 1972 Biological 
Weapons Convention. 
III. Implications of the Soviet Biological Weapons Programme 
Along with the United States and the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union was one 
of the initial proponents of the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972. However, the 
Soviet Union covertly pursued an offensive biological weapons programme even after it 
ratified the Convention. This violation is indicative of larger problems associated with 
arms control. Such agreements can be problematic because member states will pursue 
illegal activity, covertly if necessary, if they believe that it is in their best interest. As 
discussed in Chapter One, member states might pursue banned activity under the BWC in 
the interests of national security. In particular, states might retain offensive biological 
weapons capabilities so that they can retaliate if attacked with a biological weapon. 
The pursuit of an offensive biological and toxin weapons programme by the 
Soviet Union after the entry into force of the Biological Weapons Convention shows the 
limitations of Article V. The Convention lacks verification controls. No one is 
responsible for monitoring compliance with the provisions. Even if parties to the 
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Convention believed that the Soviet Union had an offensive biological weapons 
programme, they lacked the ability to verify their suspicions. The difficulties associated 
with verifying the Biological Weapons Convention are representative of those with other 
arms control agreements negotiated throughout history. States are often reluctant to 
become parties to arms control agreements that would involve intrusive monitoring. Thus 
few arms control agreements provide for stringent verification controls, including the 
1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the SALT I 
interim Agreement. An exception is the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) 
Agreement. The INF, a bilateral agreement between the Soviet Union and the United 
States, bans a class of weapons and provides for the most stringent verification controls 
ever included in a superpower arms control agreement (Falk 254). The end of the Cold 
War has seen greater attention paid to verification measures in arms control agreements. 
It remains to be seen, however, if verification and monitoring of non-compliance by 
member states will become more important elements of the BWC. The issue of 
verification will be discussed at length further on in this thesis. 
IV. The History of the Iraqi Biological Weapons Programme 
Since the early 1980s Western intelligence agencies have believed that Iraq has 
had both chemical and biological weapons capabilities, and had even used chemical 
weapons against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War and against ethnic Kurds in Iraq. There 
was, however, no proof of an offensive biological weapons programme undertaken by 
Iraq. That changed in the 1990s. With the discovery of biological weapons and weapons 
facilities on Iraqi soil by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), and 
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through the statements of a high-ranking Iraqi military official who defected in 1995, 
suspicions were confirmed and the international community had proof of the Iraqi 
programme. 
Iraq first began experimenting with biological and toxin agents in the early 1970s, 
but did not begin to aggressively pursue an offensive biological weapons programme 
until 1985 when it began research on anthrax at the Muthanna State Establishment, the 
principal Iraqi chemical weapons facility (Zilinskas 138). Iraq had already been studying 
chemical agents for use as weapons. In 1980, President Saddam Hussein invaded 
neighbouring Iran, and in 1982, reneging on international arms control obligations, first 
started using chemical weapons on not only Iranian forces, but also on ethnic Kurds in 
Iraq (Falk 243). In 1987, near the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraqi officials moved their 
biological weapons programme to Salman Park, a facility south of Baghdad that become 
the centre of a covert weapons programme (Christopher et al. 32). 
At Salman Park the Iraqi forces experimented with a series of lethal agents, 
including anthrax, Yersina pestis, aflatoxin, ricin, camel pox, gas gangrene and 
Clostridium botulinum. They had received samples of both these agents from the United 
States and France in the 1980s. In July 1995, the Center for Disease Control in Atlanta 
reported that in the 1980s it had sent to Iraq upon request more than 80 agents and 
associated biological materials including Yersinia pestis, dengue fever and West Nile 
Virus antigens and antibodies. Between 1985 and 1989, the American Type Culture 
Collection sent biological and toxin materials to Iraq which included two strains of 
Clostridium tetani, three of anthrax and five of Clostridium botulinum (Cole 85). All 
three of the deadly agents sent from American Type Culture Collection are considered to 
33 
be potential biological warfare agents . The shipment of virus, bacteria and toxin cultures 
to countries around the world for scientific study is a common practice, and one even 
encouraged in Article X of the Biological Weapons Convention which promotes the 
transfer among member states of information and technology on biological and toxin 
agents, their precursors and the equipment necessary for their study. By simply 
requesting cultures of biological and toxin agents under the guise of scientific research, 
Iraq acquired the makings of a biological weapons programme that quickly became 
offensive. 
A mutual cease-fire in August 1988 ended the war between Iran and Iraq, but 
tensions quickly escalated in the region when Iraqi forces invaded neighbouring Kuwait 
in August 1990 after demands of oil restitution from Kuwait were ignored. The 
international community quickly mobilised forces to support Kuwait, and in 1991, 
Operation Desert Storm ended the Iraqi occupation. It was determined that Iraq acted 
illegally in invading neighbouring Kuwait and the United Nations Security Council 
placed economic and military sanctions on Iraq. On 3 April1991, United Nations 
Resolution 687 created a United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM). Some 
examples of the duties UNSCOM was mandated to undertake include the following: 
carry out immediate on-site inspections of Iraq's biological, chemical and 
missile capabilities; to take possession for destruction, removal or 
rendering harmless of all chemical and biological weapons and all stocks 
of agents and all related sub-systems and components and all research, 
development, support and manufacturing facilities; to supervise the 
destruction by Iraq of all its ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 
km and related major parts, and repair and production facilities; and to 
monitor and verify Iraq's compliance with its undertaking not to use, 
develop, consult or acquire any of the items specified above (United 
Nations 2). 
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Iraq agreed to the mandate of UNSCOM and agreed to allow the inspection 
teams unrestricted freedom of entry into Iraq, unrestricted freedom of movement on Iraqi 
soil and the unrestricted right of access to any Iraqi facility for the purpose of an on-site 
inspection. The creation of UNSCOM started what would be a stream of denials by Iraq. 
Specifically, Iraq continually denied the existence of an offensive biological weapons 
programme. 
One of the first sites that UNSCOM inspected for biological and toxin weapons 
was the heart of the Iraqi offensive biological weapons programme, Salman Park. The 
area had been bulldozed and levelled to the ground by Iraqi forces and all documents and 
materials were either missing or burnt beyond recognition. However, at Salman Park the 
UNSCOM team found evidence that indicated that there had been "fermentation, 
production, aerosol testing, and storage equipment on-site" (Cole 142). This blatant 
destruction of evidence of illegal activity by the Iraqi Government, and the subsequent 
denials of the existence of a covert weapons programme, characterised the first four years 
of UNSCOM' s inspections. 
Proof of the offensive biological weapons programme came after 1995 when 
General Hussein al Kamal , President Saddam Hussein's brother-in-law, defected, 
bringing with him intimate knowledge of the Iraqi biological weapons programme. 
UNSCOM utilised this knowledge and uncovered hidden weapons munitions and 
facilities. By December 1998, UNSCOM had completed more than 250 inspections and 
had destroyed biological and chemical weapons and weapons facilities (United Nations 
4). However, in August 1998, communications between UNSCOM leader Richard Butler 
and Iraqi officials broke down when Iraq alleged that the United States engineered the 
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inspections in an effort to oust the Iraqi regime. In December 1998, after Iraqi officials 
refused UNSCOM teams access to suspected weapons facilities, the United States and the 
United Kingdom began a small air assault campaign on Iraq called Operation Desert Fox 
which targeted suspected weapons facilities . Operation Desert Fox received criticism 
from many members of the international community, including France and China. In 
December 1999, the United Nations Security Council created the United Nations 
Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) to replace UNSCOM. 
While the current status of Iraq's offensive biological and toxin weapons 
capabilities remains unknown, UNSCOM was able to identify and find specific 
components of Iraq's programme. The Iraqi non-conventional weapons programme 
contained 8,400 litres of anthrax, 19,000 litres of botulinum toxin, 2,200 litres of 
aflatoxin and 10 litres of ricin. In terms of biological weapons delivery systems, Iraq had 
25 Scud missile warheads, 157 aerial bombs, 4 aerial dispensers, an unknown quantity of 
155-mm artillery shells, artillery rockets and MiG-21 drones. As of February 1998 
UNSCOM had destroyed 8 types of delivery systems, the al-Hakam biological weapons 
facility, 480,000 litres of chemical and biological weapons munitions and 480,000 litres 
of chemical and biological agents (Floden et al. 12-13). 
V. Implications of Iraq's Biological Warfare Programme 
Like the Soviet Union, Iraq was a signatory to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and in 
1972 signed the Biological Weapons Convention. While Iraq did not ratify the Biological 
Weapons Convention until 1991 , its blatant disregard of the 1925 Geneva Protocol when 
it illegally used chemical weapons on Iranian forces and ethnic Kurds has threatened 
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peace in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. It has been estimated that a workforce of 
more than 200 people who staffed Iraq ' s biological weapons facilities is largely intact. 
Irq's civilian biotechnology industry remains undiminished after Operation Desert Fox, 
and because of the dual-use nature of the biotechnology industry, it would take only 
months for Iraq to re-start its offensive weapons programmes, if it is not already 
underway (Zilinskas 153). The experience with Iraq show's how difficult it is to ensure 
that member states do not renege upon Convention commitments. If other states in the 
Middle East, including Iran, Libya and Syria, believe that Iraq' s offensive biological 
weapons programme has been initiated, they may perceive Iraq's actions as a threat and 
may pursue a course of biological and toxin weapons proliferation. 
VI. Conclusion 
The examples of the Soviet and Iraqi offensive biological weapons programmes 
illustrate the strategic importance and value some states place on these weapons of mass 
destruction. These two case studies also demonstrate that signatories have pursued 
offensive biological weapons programmes. If other such efforts are to be prevented, and 
an international norm against the possession and use of biological and toxin agents is to 
be established, member states at the BWC Fifth Review Conference in 2001 will have to 
address the weaknesses of the Convention. 
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Chapter Four: Problems With the Biological Weapons Convention 
I. Introduction 
The history of the Soviet and Iraqi biological weapons programmes makes clear 
that the BWC has placed very few constraints on states determined to develop offensive 
weapons programmes. This chapter will examine the weaknesses of the text of the 
Biological Weapons Convention that allow member states to possess biological and toxin 
weapons. The following sections outline the key features of the text of the Convention 
and the problems with them. The key weaknesses include the ambiguous nature of the 
Convention, the allowance of biological and toxin agents for research for defensive 
purposes, a lack of verification controls and a lack of provisions in the text to regulate 
advances in the biotechnology industry. 
II. Ambiguous Nature of the Convention 
At first glance, the text of the Biological Weapons Convention would appear 
very firm in its desire to ban an entire category of weapons. However, it is obvious that 
many of the main clauses of the Convention are subject to broad interpretation. Article I 
of the Convention reads as follows: 
Each State Party to the Convention undertakes never in any circumstance 
to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: 
(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or 
method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification 
for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; 
(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents 
or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict (Wright 371). 
While Article I does set out specific rules to ban member states from possessing 
biological and toxin agents that have "no justification for protective, prophylactic and 
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other peaceful purposes" (Wright 371), as well as to ban future technical development of 
weapons, it does not adequately regulate the complex nature of biological weapons. In 
the Preamble of the Convention, which is not legally binding, a statement is made that, 
for the sake of humankind, the parties to the Convention are determined to exclude all 
possibility of biological and toxin agents being used as weapons. However, only the 
possession, and not the use, of biological and toxin weapons is regulated. 
First, the meaning of "prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes" is 
unclear and a very troublesome loophole is thus created. It allows for the development, 
production and stockpiling of potentially very dangerous, militarily relevant, biological 
agents under the auspices of research for defensive purposes. It is difficult to discern 
what "peaceful" applications actually are, therefore the term is subject to state 
interpretation. The United States, for example, has interpreted Article I as allowing 
military research for the isolation and preparation of toxins and pathogenic agents in 
order to protect civilian populations (Lappe 83). As will be discussed later in this chapter, 
it is suspicious of member states to conduct isolation research and experiments on 
biological and toxin agents because creating vaccines that protect against genetically 
manipulated agents is very difficult. It is possible that the United States and other 
member states engage in this type of research because it is easy to transfer the 
information into an offensive weapons programme. If these member states engage in 
biological and toxin weapons research, they have the ability to transfer their defensive 
weapons programme into an offensive one, for whatever purpose. Peaceful applications 
work can be distinguished from potential military applications in the production stage 
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because the production of biological agents for weapons purposes typically requires more 
equipment than that needed for research alone. 
Article I does not provide a specific list of agents or equipment prohibited or 
banned under the Convention. Because the Convention does not provide for a listing of 
agents, equipment and materials, states can continue to possess dual-use equipment, like 
fermenters capable of cultivating pathogenic organisms and cross-flow filtration 
equipment. Dual-use equipment is equipment that can be used for both defensive and 
offensive programmes. 
A second weakness in the text of the Convention lies in the wording of Article II. 
Article II of the Convention includes the following statement: 
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy or to divert to 
peaceful purposes, as soon as possible but not later than nine months after 
entry into force of the Convention, all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment 
and means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention, which are in 
its possession or under its jurisdiction or control (Wright 371-372). 
Stipulating that member states have the option either to destroy or divert to 
peaceful purposes stockpiles of biological and toxin agents leads to the question as to 
what "peaceful purposes" entail. Pursuant to the objections raised over the wording of 
Article I, it should be noted once again that by allowing biological and toxin agents to be 
researched for defensive purposes, the Convention is exempting member states from 
destroying stockpiles of agents that have the potential to be used for military purposes. 
Furthermore, the Convention does not specify the amount of stockpiles that are allowed 
for peaceful purposes. In all probability, member states would be more likely to "divert to 
peaceful purposes" their facilities, equipment and stockpiles of agents than to destroy 
them. Doing so would allow them to continue research that may be utilised for an 
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offensive biological weapons programme without violating the accord. The diversion to 
peaceful purposes of stockpiles, while permissible, does not eliminate biological and 
toxin agents. 
Article IV of the Convention is also vague with respect to state implementation. 
Article IV of the Convention includes the following: 
Each State Party to this Convention shall , in accordance with its 
constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit the 
development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of the 
agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in 
article I of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under its 
jurisdiction or under its control anywhere (Wright 372). 
This wording raises the question of what "constitutional processes" are. The text of this 
Article does not specify the national and constitutional measures states should follow, 
therefore allowing parties to interpret the required constitutional processes based on their 
own foreign policy and national interest. 
While compliance and verification measures will be discussed further along in 
this chapter, the inadequacies of the wording of Article VI, which covers these provisions 
should be briefly mentioned. Article VI provides that any member state suspecting 
another state of violating provisions of the Convention may lodge a complaint with the 
United Nations Security Council. However, the five permanent members of the Security 
Council (the United States, Great Britain, France, China and the Russian Federation) all 
have the power to veto any Council resolutions. All five permanent members of the 
Security Council also have or have had in the past defensive or offensive biological and 
toxin weapons programmes. Allowing the Security Council to handle and veto any 
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allegations of non-compliance with the provisions of the Biological Weapons Convention 
diminishes the likelihood of complaints being registered against offending states. 
Further weaknesses of the text of the Convention can be found in Article X, 
which requires the "exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological 
information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful 
purposes" (Wright 373-374). Despite proposals from developing states that are parties to 
the Convention, Article X has never been implemented (Chevrier and Smithson 215). It is 
highly probable that unless this article is enforced, or that a compromise is made between 
developed and developing states, some non-signatories, including Algeria, Angola, 
Eritrea, Kazakstan and Tajikstan, will not become member states. They believe that 
developed parties have an unfair technological advantage (SIPRI-Non-Signatories to the 
BTWC 1-2). This debate under the BWC reflects a standard North-South issue in most 
multilateral negotiations. Many developed countries have resisted making assistance to 
developing countries mandatory because they believe doing so will limit their potential to 
make a profit from the sale of the information and technologies. An exchange of 
information and technology is very important because it increases transparency among 
member states. However, the activities of member states would have to be monitored to 
ensure that developing states receiving information and technology from the developed 
states do not use it to create offensive weapons capabilities. 
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III. Research for Defensive Purposes 
While Article I and Article II of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention ban the 
use and possession of biological and toxin agents except for peaceful, protective and 
prophylactic uses, the Convention clearly allows for research on biological and toxin 
agents for defensive measures to protect combatants and non-combatant populations from 
a biological warfare attack from an enemy state or terrorist. According to Marc Lappe, 
three distinctly different kinds of biological research can be identified. The first type is 
research that directly aids an offensive biological weapons programme. The second is 
research that simultaneously creates an offensive and defensive capability. The final type 
is research the ends of which are purely defensive in nature (Lappe 80). Purely defensive 
research includes the production of vaccines and anti-serums from existing viruses, 
bacteria and toxins, and the development of protective clothing, breathing apparatuses, 
etc. to protect combatants and civilian populations from an attack with a biological or 
toxin weapon. 
The first type of research is banned under the provisions of the Biological 
Weapons Convention. However, the second and third types of research can be part of, or 
contribute to, a broader offensive weapons effort that has military significance. A fine 
line separates research with ends that are purely defensive in nature from research that 
contains offensive aspects, but is for defensive purposes. Many states engage in the latter 
type of research because they believe that it may allow them to protect combatants and 
civilian populations from biological attack. 
The regulation of biological and toxin agents for research and defence is very 
difficult. When a new weapon is developed, efforts will be made to produce a 
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counterweapon or a defence against it (Morgenthau 287). However, what makes one state 
secure can make another state insecure, and eventually efforts of one can lead to an arms 
spiral. It should be noted that because of advances in biotechnology and genetic 
engineering, it is virtually impossible to have an effective defence that would protect 
military and civilian populations from any sort of biological attack. This is because the 
agent used for an attack can be genetically altered to so that it will be resistant to known 
vaccinations and anti-serums (Novick and Shulman 117). 
To explore further what research for defensive purposes entails for parties to the 
Convention that are ardently pursing extensive defensive programmes it is useful to 
consider six general areas of biological warfare research. These include: (1) isolation of 
preparation of toxins and pathogenic organisms; (2) prophylactic measures, which 
include using vaccines and other diseases preventative measures; (3) therapeutic 
measures, which include using antibiotics, antiviral drugs and antidotes; (4) protective 
clothing and equipment, which include respirators and protective suits; (5) monitoring 
and detection devices; and (6) methods of decontamination (Lappe 82). Components of 
all six types of research can also be used for offensive purposes. For example, member 
states that use protective clothing and equipment for defensive research can also use them 
to protect scientists in the creation of offensive weapons or soldiers mounting such an 
attack. 
The United States has argued that all six areas of research are fundamentally 
important to defensive research programmes because, in order to defend against a 
possible attack from biological and toxin weapons, an agent must be isolated and 
analysed so that a vaccine can be developed that counteracts its use. However, because of 
44 
the nature of biological and toxin agents, the same research can also be used for an 
offensive weapons programme. The creation and maintenance of a defensive biological 
weapons programme necessarily entails a comprehensive study of biological and toxin 
agents, including the generation and growth of these agents, and the infective nature, 
pathogenic capacity and resistance to meteorological conditions of agents. Such research 
requires also the creation of a research facility that contains all necessary protective 
clothing and equipment (King and Strauss 123). 
Among the by-products of a defensive weapons research programme are 
capabilities and technical know-how required for transferring a defensive research 
programme into an offensive one. Defensive research programmes can thus be a front for 
offensive programmes. Advances in biotechnology increase the ability to transfer 
defensive weapons knowledge into offensive weapons programmes, as well as allowing 
for large amounts of militarily useful agents to be created in a short time, thus making 
stockpiling less important and reducing the chances of potential detection. 
It is difficult to distinguish defensive from offensive weapons programmes 
because they use similar equipment and micro-organisms, the dual-use phenomenon. 
[O]ffensive and defensive biological warfare research programmes, 
particularly defensive programs that focus on the properties of specific 
BW agents, share the same components. One has to rely on the stated 
intent of the program to distinguish between offensive and defensive 
efforts. Thus a program aimed at defences against BW agents may easily 
be misconstrued by adversary nations and is provocative in character 
(King and Strauss 125). 
For example, in the early 1990s, the United States accused Iran of pursuing an 
offensive weapons programme. In 1988 and 1989, Iran attempted to purchase mycotoxins 
(toxic substances produced by fungi growing on grain, seed or food) from both Canada 
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and the Netherlands. However, the United States admitted that, while the Iranian 
programme was suspect, it was also possible that the mycotoxins could have been used as 
part of a defensive programme (Spiers 37). 
One of the methods used to distinguish between a defensive research programme 
and an offensive one is to look at the size of the programme. It is likely that an offensive 
biological weapons programme will have larger stockpiles, more equipment and more 
staff than a defensive programme. Such evaluation, however, requires a certain level of 
information. 
IV. Lack of Verification and Monitoring of Compliance Provisions 
The inability to verify compliance with an arms control agreement severely limits 
its effectiveness. Verification can involve the monitoring of the activities banned by the 
agreement and the assessment of compliance with treaty provisions (Pilat 81). When the 
Biological Weapons Convention was signed in 1972, it severely lacked such verification 
and monitoring provisions. During negotiation of the Convention both France and 
Sweden argued that the Convention needed strong verification provisions. However, 
opposition from other states led to weak provisions to address the issue of non-
compliance. Article V of the Convention includes the following statement: 
The States Parties to this Convention undertake to consult one another 
and to cooperate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to 
the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention. 
Consultation and cooperation pursuant to this article may also be 
undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the 
framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter 
(Wright 372). 
Article VI of the Convention includes the following provisions: 
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(1) Any State Party to this Convention which finds that any other State 
Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the 
Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the 
United Nations. Such a complaint should include all possible evidence 
confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the 
Security Council. 
(2) Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to cooperate in 
carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in 
accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on 
the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council 
shall inform the States Parties to the Convention of the results of the 
investigation (Wright 372-373). 
Article V of the Convention thus provides for an informal consultation and 
cooperation process that is voluntary unless pursued within the framework of the United 
Nations. Article VI of the Convention, which is the only formal complaint process 
provided for in the Convention, has been ineffectual (Chevrier and Smithson 212). By 
the end of the Fourth Review Conference no complaints of illegal activity had been made 
to the Security Council. And, as noted, any permanent member of the Security Council 
could veto any investigation into non-compliance. It is highly unlikely that any of the 
permanent five members of the Security Council would permit an investigation if they 
themselves were accused of inappropriate behaviour, or one of their strategic allies were 
accused of non-compliance. 
Critics have argued that the Biological Weapons Convention needs to provide for 
more effective verification. Verification measures could, in theory, prevent horizontal 
and vertical proliferation and could deter signatories from non-compliance activities, 
which might include creating novel biological and toxin agents for military purposes, as 
well as manipulating an existing biological or toxin agent for non-research purposes. 
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Examples of the sorts of verification provisions that could be applied to the BWC include 
the following examples: 
(1) cooperative measures, which include the voluntary exchange and declaration of 
activities and information on research and defence, as well as on all activities in 
Bio-level Four laboratories (where the micro-organisms are studied that have no 
cure) and human vaccine production facilities, the monitoring of weapons and 
delivery systems through agreed upon checkpoints and the non-interference of 
member states from inspection of facilities and verification means (Calogero et al. 
4); 
(2) national technical means (NTM), which include non-intrusive technical 
surveillance from satellites in outer space and radar and optical surveillance from 
locations outside the state that is being inspected/monitored (Calogero et al. 4); 
(3) the use of technical monitoring devices that are covertly or openly placed at or 
near research and defence sites and suspected offensive weapons sites (Calogero 
et al. 4); 
(4) on-site inspections which may be previously agreed upon, or may be surprise or 
challenge inspections that use visual inspection to assess compliance as well as 
biological sampling (Calogero et al. 4). An example of on-site and challenge 
inspections are the activities undertaken by the UNSCOM team in Iraq; 
(5) national intelligence gathering, including the utilisation of agents/operatives, 
statement and confessions from defectors, communication intercepts and 
information leaks (Calogero et al. 4). 
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IV. Provisions for Advances in the Biotechnology Industry 
In 1972, when the Biological Weapons Convention was signed, genetic 
engineering and other new biotechnologies, such as nucleus transfers, had not been 
developed. Biotechnology is a broad term and can be loosely defined as the "production 
of innovative products, devices and organisms by exploitation of biological processes" 
(Dando 100). Deoxyribonucleic acids (DNA) and ribonucleic acids (RNA) are the 
chemical substances of genes, serving the dual function of hereditary transmission and of 
programming the cell to perform its biological functions (Novick and Shulman 107). In 
the early 1980s, through using recombinant DNA and RNA genetic manipulation tools, 
scientists discovered that they could also manipulate the physical properties of viruses 
and bacteria that are disease and virus causing organisms. The ability to manipulate a 
micro-organism or toxin agent with relative ease and safety has made the biotechnology 
revolution a threat to the effectiveness of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention 
because the original text of the Convention had no provisions to regulate advances in the 
biotechnology industry. 
The biotechnology revolution has had an enormous impact on the study and 
production of biological and toxin agents, whether for legal defensive purposes, or for 
offensive ones. Malcom Dando provides a list of seven new scientific technologies that 
have changed the nature of germ warfare. These seven technologies are recombinant 
DNA (genetic engineering), protein engineering, computer-aided orthomolecular drug 
design, fermentation engineering, mammalian cell culture, peptide synthesis, and 
biophysics of cell membranes (Dando 132). 
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Through the use of these seven biotechnologies, scientists have revolutionised the 
industry that studies micro-organisms and toxin agents. Scientists can manipulate 
previously harmless organisms, as well as create novel ones, which makes biological and 
toxin agents even more appealing weapons to some states and groups. Through genetic 
engineering, scientists can increase the virulence, lethality and stability of an agent, as 
well as circumvent a human's or animal's immunity and defences against micro-
organisms. Perhaps the most alarming result of biotechnologies is the potential to 
engineer agents that can attack specific racial or ethnic groups, for example, humans with 
sickle cell anaemia. Sickle cell anaemia is prevalent among people of African ancestry. 
Typically, the use and dissemination of biological and toxin agents depends upon 
meteorological and environmental conditions. With advances in genetic engineering, 
scientists can manipulate the properties of a biological agent, making it more hardy, and 
therefore less reliant upon meteorological and environmental conditions. As well, the 
physical properties of an agent can be manipulated so that the intense heat and force 
generated by its launching in artillery and rocket shells will not kill the agent, making the 
agent more effective for use on the battlefield and therefore a threat to global security. 
Advances in biotechnology that enable scientists to manipulate the genetic 
properties of a virus make it more difficult for a state to defend against an attack with an 
engineered agent because the physical properties of the agent may be different from its 
known form. These factors, coupled with the ability of the attacking state to protect 
combatants and non-combatants with vaccines against the virus, are the driving forces 
behind the motivation for many states and terrorist organisations to use biological and 
toxin agents as weapons. In short, biotechnology has revolutionised the spectrum of 
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biological warfare, threatening national and global security through the potential creation 
of more hardy, lethal and novel agents. 
VI. Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrates the weaknesses of the Biological Weapons Convention 
that have compromised its inability to prevent member states from possessing biological 
and toxin agents for offensive purposes. The purpose of the Biological Weapons 
Convention was to ban member states from possessing biological and toxin agents that 
did not have justification for peaceful, prophylactic and other protective purposes. It is 
necessary to identify these weaknesses before making suggestions on how to strengthen 
the regime and how to create an international norm against the possession and use of 
biological and toxin weapons. These weaknesses reflect arms control dilemmas and 
debates that have been prevalent throughout history, as identified in Chapter Two, and as 
reflected in the realist and idealist schools of thought. 
The next chapter will discuss the international efforts that have been taken to 
strengthen the weaknesses of the Biological Weapons Convention, looking specifically at 
the four Review Conferences that have been held by member states in an effort to address 
the weaknesses of the Convention. 
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Chapter Five: Efforts to Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention 
I. Introduction 
Since the Biological Weapons Convention entered into force on 26 March 1975, 
member states have held four review conferences, in 1981, 1986, 1991 and 1996. Article 
XII of the Convention provides that parties to the Convention must hold a review 
conference within five years to "review the operation of the Convention, with a view to 
"ensuring" that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, 
including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being 
realized" (Wright 374). Parties have attempted to address the weaknesses of the 
Convention, and in some cases have tried to modify major provisions, but have only had 
incremental success. By consensus among member states at the review conferences a 
modified interpretation of the Convention is adopted in the Final Declaration. The 
modifications expressed in the Final Declaration are legally binding, even though, 
curiously, the actual text of the Convention is not amended. While member states have 
attended the four review conferences since 1972, the broader international community 
beyond the review table has also been very involved in the movement to ban biological 
weapons as weapons of mass destruction. Many non-governmental organisations and 
scholars of international relations have been integrally involved in this arms control 
effort. In some cases they have made a significant impact on inter-state negotiations at 
the review conferences. Some of these organisations include the Australia Group, the 
Federation of American Scientists, the Stockholm Peace Research Institute and the 
University of Bradford. These groups have been involved in the incremental 
strengthening process but their role will not be analysed here. This chapter will discuss 
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the outcomes of the four review conferences and the modifications made to the 
Biological Weapons Convention. It will not, indeed cannot, provide a full account or 
explanation of the proceedings of these conferences because the relevant transcripts have 
not been released. Suffice it to say, the incremental progress made at the review 
conferences is illustrative of the broader dilemmas of arms control. The end of the Cold 
War did not result in significant changes in the BWC because some member states still 
subscribe to the realist rhetoric that legitimises a narrow definition of security centred 
almost entirely on the efficacy of weapons to protect states from security threats. 
However, even the incremental modifications achieved at the four review conferences 
may help in the creation of an international norm against the possession and use of 
biological and toxin weapons. 
II. The First Review Conference 
When the First Review Conference was held in Geneva in March 1981, member 
states were meeting out of obligation rather than out of urgency to strengthen the 
Convention. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, there was little concern over the 
threat of biological weapons being used in warfare. Advances in biotechnology were not 
significant enough to pose a problem to the Convention or to the security of states, and 
most observers believed that the development of novel pathogenic microorganisms and 
toxins was a task of insurmountable complexity (Wright 54). Proof of the Soviet and 
Iraqi bio-weapons programme and the accident at Sverdlosk had not come to light, 
allowing signatory states to believe that the creation and maintenance of offensive 
weapons programmes was not an immediate threat to either the Convention or global 
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security. The conclusion of the First Review Conference, not surprisingly, failed to result 
in any significant changes to the Convention. 
On the Preamble of the Final Declaration of the First Review Conference, the 
member states reaffirmed their strong determination to ban eventually the possession and 
use of biological and toxin weapons. To help achieve their goal, they made minor 
changes to Articles IT, IV, V and X. Article II of the Convention was modified to include 
a statement on voluntary declarations by member states, concerning their programmes, 
recognising that a few parties had made voluntary declarations to the effect that they did 
not possess biological and toxin agents and/or the equipment and means necessary for 
delivering them. Pursuant to voluntary declarations, Article II further states that "The 
Conference believes that such voluntary declarations contribute to increased confidence 
in the Convention and believes that States not having made such voluntary declarations 
should do so" (SIPRI-First Review Conference 2). 
A second small change to the Convention can be found in Article IV, which states 
that "The Conference invites States Parties which have found it necessary to enact 
specific legislation or take other regulatory measures relevant to this Article to make 
available the appropriate texts to the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, for the 
purpose of consultation" (SIPRI-First Review Conference 2). Requiring member states to 
provide the United Nations Centre for Disarmament with annual declarations of 
legislative activities allows both member states and international organisations to assess a 
component of compliance by the members. 
One of the more important political agreements at the 1981 Review Conference 
relates to Article V of the Convention. While the changes made are only minimal, it is 
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important to note that member states at least recognised in the early 1980s that the 
verification and compliance monitoring mechanisms in the Convention were inadequate. 
Member states agreed that interested parties should: 
use various international procedures which would make it possible to 
ensure effectively and adequately the implementation of the Convention 
provisions taking into account the concern expressed by the Conference 
participants to this effect. These procedures include inter alia, the right of 
any State Party subsequently to request that a consultative meeting open to 
all States Parties be convened at expert level (SIPRI-First Review 
Conference 3). 
These small changes make the consultation and cooperation process less informal and set 
the stage for future development of the article. One of Ross ' s four key functions of arms 
control agreements, mentioned in Chapter One, is building confidence among member 
states by providing greater transparency in negotiations and improving confidence 
building measures. These changes begin to move the BWC toward that end. 
Article X of the Final Declaration of the First Review Conference called upon the 
developed states to provide economic and social assistance to developing countries. This 
assistance would include help in the disarmament process, as well as with the scientific 
and technical use of biological and toxin agents for peaceful purposes. Although the idea 
of cooperation between the developed and developing world was mentioned, no concrete 
guidelines or rules for this cooperation were set out, leaving any such cooperation both 
vague and voluntary. In order to strengthen the Convention more concrete guidelines will 
have to be negotiated and implemented. 
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II. The Second Review Conference 
After the First Review Conference was concluded in 1981 , a series of events set 
the stage for the Second Review Conference, held in Geneva in September 1986. These 
events, and the failure of the First Review Conference to result in any significant changes 
to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, coupled with advances in the scientific 
community and biotechnology industry that could potentially change the nature of germ 
warfare, led the member states to confirm that they had a common interest in 
strengthening the "authority and effectiveness of the Convention" (SIPRI-Second Review 
Conference 1). While the progress made in the Second Review Conference was only 
minor, in relation to the First, it can be described as successful in providing momentum 
and support for strengthening the biological and toxin weapons regime. 
Throughout the Second Review Conference, parties made a variety of proposals 
and submitted position papers on how to strengthen the weak Convention. Member states 
made proposals on strengthening Article V and Article X, promoting international 
cooperation among scientists and research facilities in order to bridge the divide between 
the 'North ' and the 'South' (Sims 269). One of the more surprising proposals on how to 
make the Convention more effective came on September 15, from the Soviet delegation 
leader, who proposed that a subsequent negotiation take place on a supplementary 
protocol that "would institute stronger procedures for verifying compliance with the 
Convention" (Sims 270). As was discussed in Chapter Three, the Soviet Union had 
covertly pursued an aggressive offensive biological and toxin weapons programme 
during the 1970s and 1980s. During the mid to late 1980s, Soviet President Mikhail 
Gorbachev was instituting his polices of openness to the West. It can be surmised that 
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when the Sr viet delegation proposed verification negotiations, it was either attempting to 
demom' ;ate a desire to cooperate with other member states or knew that its proposal 
wot·~d be defeated by the rival superpower, the United States. Although the verification 
:--roposal was indeed defeated, the member states were able to agree to modifications 
affecting the interpretation of Articles I, III, IV, V and X. 
At the First Review Conference little attention was paid to Article I of the 
Convention which allows biological and toxin agents for "prophylactic, protective or 
other peaceful purposes." However, with the advent of biotechnology and the potential to 
engineer harmless micro-organisms and toxins into deadly, virulent weapons, the member 
states at the Second Review Conference made minor revisions to Article I. They agreed 
that "the Convention unequivocally applies to all natural or artificially created microbial 
or other biological agents or toxins whatever their origin or method of production" 
(SIPRI- Second Review Conference 2). The member states thus affirmed that the use of 
genetic engineering to make biological weapons would not be permitted, while ensuring 
that the prophylactic, protective or peaceful purposes of the new technologies were 
allowed, therefore placing little restriction upon the scientific and technology industry. 
To guarantee that these technologies were not used to create deadly biological and toxin 
weapons, it would have been prudent of the member states in Article I to define the 
parameters of research for defensive purposes with biological and toxin weapons, as well 
as to create a list of biological and toxin agents that were not permitted for research. 
In an attempt to ensure that member states did not assist or in any way encourage 
another state to develop a biological and toxin weapons programme, in 1972 the parties 
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to the Convention created Article III. Article III of the Convention includes the 
following: 
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any 
recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, 
encourage, or induce any State, group of States or international 
organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, 
toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in Article I of 
this Convention (Wright 372). 
At the Second Review Conference the parties agreed to modify Article III, and 
added the statement "The Conference notes that the provisions of this Article should not 
be used to impose restrictions and/or limitations on the transfer for purposes consistent 
with the objectives and the provisions of the Convention of scientific knowledge, 
technology, equipment and materials to States Parties" (SIPRI-Second Review 
Conference 3). Article III was thus modified to ensure that it did not detract from Article 
X and restrict the transfer of technology and information between the developed and 
developing states. While this new addition ensured that restrictions were not placed on 
member states that could hamper international cooperation, it also posed a threat to the 
goal of banning states from possessing biological and toxin weapons. 
Another change to the Convention during the Second Review Conference related 
to Article IV, which discusses the implementation of national measures. The First Review 
Conference made only a minor adjustment to Article IV by mentioning that if parties 
found it necessary to enact specific legislation they should make available the appropriate 
texts to the United Nations Centre for Disarmament. The Second Review Conference 
built on these adjustments and added a statement noting the importance of legislative, 
administrative and other measures that parties undertake to guarantee compliance with 
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the provisions of the Convention. In order to help prevent unauthorised access to and 
removal or theft of pathogenic and toxin material , Article IV now allows member states 
to enact legislation for the physical protection of laboratories and facilities . As well , 
Article IV promotes the inclusion of information on the Biological Weapons Convention 
in textbooks and medical, scientific and military education programmes (SIPRI-Second 
Review Conference 3). Although the legislative provisions that were discussed in Article 
IV were voluntary only, the institution of voluntary reporting systems and national 
implementation measures further promotes compliance with the provisions of the 
Convention. 
At the Second Review Conference t~e member states also added four voluntary 
confidence building measures under the auspices of Article V that were intended to 
promote transparency, cooperation and confidence among parties to the Convention. In 
this way the BWC process reflected one of Ross's four key functions of arms control, 
confidence building measures to increase transparency among member states. Addition of 
the confidence building measures reflected a concern over the possibility that member 
states could pursue an offensive biological weapons programme under the guise of 
defensive research. The four voluntary confidence building measures were as follows: 
(a) the exchange of data on biological research centres and laboratories that meet 
very high national and international safety standards; 
(b) the exchange of information on all irregular outbreaks of diseases and toxins; 
(c) the encouragement of publications of results of biological research directly 
related to the Convention; and 
(d) the active promotion of contacts between scientists engaged in biological 
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research directly related to the Convention, including the exchanges of joint 
research on a mutually agreed basis (SIPRI-Second Review Conference 4-5). 
Even though the confidence building measures added at the Second Review Conference 
were voluntary only, they did set the stage for future negotiations on such measures. 
As was the case with the First Review Conference, most of the attention during 
the Second focused on Article X, which discusses the transfer and exchange of 
information and technologies between the developed and developing countries that are 
member states. Throughout the negotiations in September many proposals were made 
regarding the notion of cooperation among parties to the Convention. Additions to Article 
X included a statement promoting the transfer and exchange of information concerning 
research programmes in bio-sciences among member states, the long-term transfer and 
exchange of information, materials and equipment among parties, the active promotion of 
contacts between scientists and technical personnel in states, and the promotion of 
regional and national programmes in relevant biological fields among member states 
(SIPRI-Second Review Conference 6-7). 
The Second Review Conference agreed to hold an ad hoc meeting of scientific 
and technical experts to finalise the modalities for the exchange of information and data. 
The ad hoc meeting was held in Geneva from March 15 until April15 1987. The results 
of the Second Review Conference, along with the ad hoc group meeting in 1987, paved 
the way for the Third Review Conference of member states. 
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III. The Third Review Conference 
The Third Review Conference on the Biological Weapons Convention was held 
in Geneva in September 1991. In the Preamble of the Final Declaration the member states 
reaffirmed their conviction that universal adherence to the Convention would enhance 
international peace and security. Pursuant to the goal to ban biological and toxin agents 
as weapons of mass destruction, the Third Review Conference focussed mainly on 
Article V and Article X, while minor modifications were added to Article I and Article 
IX. 
Article I of the Final Declaration emphasised the vital importance of full 
implementation of all the provisions set out in the Convention by member states because 
non-compliance could severely undermine confidence in the Convention. However, 
Article I did not fully address the issue of non-compliance as it did not include a list of 
measures or remedial actions that result when non-compliance with the Convention's 
provisions occurs. 
Perhaps the most interesting and important modifications to Article I during the 
Third Review Conference centred on the inclusion of a provision banning 
experimentation involving the open-air release of pathogens or toxins harmful to man, 
animals, or plants that had no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful 
purposes (research and defence) (SIPRI-Third Review Conference 2). This addition 
showed that member states recognised the threat biological and toxin agents posed to 
humans and the environment and showed that member states were willing to place more 
restrictions on permissible state activity, thereby reducing the likelihood of an accidental 
release of a biological or toxin agent. This action related directly to the anthrax accident 
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in Sverdlovsk in 1979 as the Soviet scientists were experimenting with an aerosol form of 
anthrax. While the Convention does still allow for experimentation involving the open-
air release of biological and toxin agents (for the creation of vaccines and protection 
equipment including breathing apparatuses and protection suits), recognition of the threat 
posed to the human and natural environment from the open-air release of pathogens was 
important. 
Expanding on the four confidence building measures agreed upon at the Second 
Review Conference, the ad hoc group which met in 1987 elaborated on several issues 
from Article V, encouraging voluntary declarations by member states in relation to the 
confidence building measures. However, when the Third Review Conference met in 
Geneva in 1991, concern was raised over the lack of actual declarations of activities, 
prompting the inclusion of several more confidence building measures in the Convention. 
At the Third Review Conference, seven mandatory confidence building measures were 
included in Article V. These included the following: (a) exchange of data on research 
centres and laboratories and the exchange of information on national biological defence 
research and development programmes; (b) exchange of information on outbreaks of 
infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins; (c) encouragement of 
publication of results and promotion of use of knowledge; (d) active promotion of 
contacts; (e) declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures; (f) declaration of 
past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological research and development 
programmes; (g) declaration of vaccine production facilities (SIPRI-Third Review 
Conference 5). 
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It should be noted that while measures one to five above are very important, 
measures six and seven are integral to the analysis of the capabilities of member states 
weapons programmes. To further strengthen Article V, the text of the Convention was 
further modified at the review Conference. Parties to the Convention were to be required 
to submit reports on confidence building measures to the United Nations Department for 
Disarmament Affairs before April 15 every year. In a change to Article V the parties 
established an ad hoc Group of Governmental Experts open to all member states, known 
as VEREX, to identify and examine potential verification measures that could be applied 
to the Biological Weapons Convention from a scientific and technical standpoint. The 
findings of VEREX will be discussed briefly in the section on the Fourth Review 
Conference. 
During the negotiations of the Third Review Conference, states once again noted 
the increasing gap between the developed and developing countries in biotechnology and 
genetic engineering. The key issue separating the 'North' from the 'South' was the 
proposal that developed states should transfer information and technology on biological 
and toxin agents and new biotechnologies to the developing states so that the technology 
gaps could be bridged (Dando 78). An ongoing debate over Article X on the cooperation 
among developed and developing states marked all four of the review conferences. 
The Final Draft of the Third Review Conference recognised that the provisions of 
Article X were not being followed by member states. Article X notes the increasing gap 
between the developed and developing countries in the field of biotechnology, genetic 
engineering and microbiology, and proposes that states party to the Convention take 
specific measures for the promotion of international cooperation. These measures 
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included "increased technical cooperation and assistance, including training programmes 
to developing countries in the use of bio-sciences and genetic engineering for peaceful 
purposes through active association with United Nations institutions" (SIPRI- Third 
Review Conference 11 ), and the establishment of a world data bank under the supervision 
of the United Nations. 
The Third Review Conference held in 1991 thus achieved a small success by 
adding confidence building measures to increase transparency among member states. 
Transparency is an important factor in eliciting compliance in cases where states have 
incentives or desires to violate provisions of the arms control agreement (Young 276). 
V. The Fourth Review Conference 
The Fourth Review Conference, held in Geneva from 25 November to 13 
December 1996, was an effort to strengthen the BWC, and perhaps for some member 
states, to prevent its strengthening. During the Conference, member states negotiated a 
series of important issues, including the continuing question of how to achieve greater 
transparency through confidence building measures. The results were, however, 
disappointing. 
During the negotiations Iran proposed that a formal amendment be made to 
include the word "use" in the title of the BWC, to make it the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. Reference to banning use 
would also appear in Article I. While the Convention currently does not allow member 
states to possess offensive biological and toxin weapons, there is no prohibition of the 
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actual use of the weapon by signatory states. The addition of the word "use" to the title of 
the BWC and amendment to Article I would broaden the spectrum of banned activities in 
the Convention. Unfortunately, the Iranian proposal was opposed by other member states 
and the title of the Convention and Article I were not amended (The University of 
Bradford 5). However, other changes were instituted to Articles I, V, IX and X. 
During the negotiations of the First, Second and Third Review Conferences, some 
states party to the Convention recognised the inherent weakness of Article V with respect 
to ensuring verification and monitoring of compliance with the provisions set out under 
the Convention. Throughout the first three review conferences incremental progress was 
made towards strengthening Article V. According to Pearson and Chevrier, by 1996, just 
over half of the states party to the Convention had made only a single voluntary 
declaration of compliance, and only eleven parties had made annual declarations. The 
Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference recognised that participation in the 
confidence building measures was not universal. The Conference once again reiterated 
the legal requirement for parties to report annual declarations of activities. 
The Final Declaration of the ad hoc group meeting of Verification Experts 
(VEREX) was published in 1994. VEREX had been mandated by the Third Review 
Conference to identify, examine and evaluate possible verification measures that could be 
applied to the Biological Weapons Convention from a technical and scientific standpoint. 
The VEREX meetings produced a consensus report that stated that potential verification 
measures could be useful in varying degrees in enhancing confidence through increased 
transparency and that reliance could not be placed on any single confidence building 
measure by itself to differentiate conclusively between legal and illegal activity (Kadlec 
65 
et al. 103). The reports of VEREX and possible verification measures for the BWC were 
discussed at the Fourth Review Conference but nothing concrete was ever agreed upon. 
The inability of the Fourth Conference to add recommendations on verification measures 
to the text of the Convention illustrates the slow progress, at best, that has marked all four 
review conferences and the inability of the Convention to encourage movement towards 
the elimination of biological and toxin weapons. 
On 13 January 1993, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was opened for 
signature in Paris. In the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference of the 
Biological Weapons Convention, under Article IX, the states party to the Convention 
acknowledged their support for this Convention and mentioned the importance of having 
parties to the BWC become parties to the CWC. Chapter Six will identify aspects of the 
latter that might be used to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention. 
The Fourth Review Conference once again emphasised the importance of the 
provisions of Article X. In an effort to promote scientific and technical cooperation 
among member states, parties to the Convention agreed on the following: 
The Conference recalls that the States Parties have a legal obligation to 
facilitate and have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange 
of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for 
the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful 
purposes and not to hamper the economic and technological development 
of States Parties (University of Bradford 10). 
Furthermore, the parties to the Convention agreed that international efforts to establish a 
system of global monitoring of disease were very important. Parties were encouraged to 
cooperate with one another to strengthen the capabilities of national programmes for the 
early notification, surveillance, control and response. The technologies used in this 
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surveillance and monitoring could also be used in the detection of biological and toxin 
agents. It was decided that a Fifth Review Conference would be held in Geneva in 2001. 
A Special Conference is slated to be held before the Fifth Review Conference at which an 
ad hoc group will analyse the report issued by VEREX and will submit a report on 
potential verification measures that can be added in the Biological Weapons Convention. 
VI. Conclusion 
The four review conferences demonstrate two points. First, the progress achieved 
by the member states in strengthening the Convention has been minute only and the key 
weaknesses noted in Chapter Four have not been corrected. The lack of progress is a 
reflection of the inherent difficulties of dealing with biological weapons. As mentioned in 
Chapter Two, states pursue weapons programmes because they believe that these 
weapons will protect their national security. The development of a strong biological arms 
control agreement will require a fundamental shift by those opposed to strengthening the 
current Convention. Having said that, there is, nevertheless, some merit in examining 
how to strengthen the Convention with the view towards creating an international norm 
against possession and use. 
The second lesson of the review conferences is that when key issues like 
verification and non-compliance are negotiated, the play of power politics affects the 
outcome. Some member states are reluctant to strengthen verification provisions even if 
they not are pursuing an offensive biological and toxin weapons programme. 
The dilemmas associated with arms control agreements notwithstanding, the key 
weaknesses of the text of the Convention should be addressed at the next Review 
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Conference. An increase in horizontal proliferation threatens national and global security 
through the creation of an arms spiral. The possibility that a rogue state or terrorist group 
will acquire a biological or toxin weapon and could use it in an attack, possibly 
prompting retaliation against the attacker, heightens the need to ban the possession and 
use of biological and toxin weapons. 
Chapter Six: Suggestions for Strengthening the Convention 
I. Introduction 
When the Biological Weapons Convention was signed in 1972, it was the first 
international arms control agreement since 1925 to ban an entire class of weapons. The 
states party to the Convention undertook neyer under any circumstance to develop, 
produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain biological and toxin agents and the 
weapons, equipment and means used for their delivery that had no justification for 
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. Pursuant to their objective to ban 
states from possessing biological and toxin agents as weapons of war, the member states 
agreed to 15 articles that set out provisions and guidelines needed for the implementation 
of the Convention. 
The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention is an example of an arms control 
agreement that aims at prohibiting possession of weapons in order to enhance security in 
the international community. The Convention also attempts to reduce the financial costs 
of military rivalry in peacetime through Article X which promotes technological 
cooperation among member states. Proponents of a strengthened Biological Weapons 
Convention seek to "impose some kind of restraint or regulation on the qualitative design, 
quantitative production, method of deployment, protection, control, transfer, and planned, 
threatened or actual use of military forces and weapons" (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Jr. 
413). Parties should agree to strengthen the Convention if they believe that the benefits of 
doing so will outweigh the costs of a weak and therefore ineffective regime. The benefits 
of a strengthened BWC include possible universal acceptance and the promotion of an 
international norm banning both possession and use of biological and toxin weapons. 
However, if member states' perceptions of self-interest dictate that the costs outweigh the 
benefits (for example through losing possible first-use capability or retaliatory 
capabilities), they will oppose a strengthened Convention and negotiations at the Fifth 
Review Conference will suffer. Thus, it should be emphasised, a significant strengthening 
of the Convention may well be difficult, even impossible, to achieve in the near future. 
This chapter will, nevertheless, offer proposals to address the weaknesses of the 
Convention, in the order that they were addressed in Chapter Four. It is important to note 
that some of the issues discussed in Chapter Four are more important than others. I 
believe that the issue of the inclusion of the term "use" in the title of the Convention, the 
regulation of research for defensive purposes, and the inclusion of verification controls in 
the text are the most important ones for the Fifth Review Conference because they are the 
largest loopholes in the Convention through which dangerous and illegal activity can be 
undertaken. However, the issue of ambiguity of the text and the regulation of the 
biotechnology industry are also important to the overall strengthening of the Convention. 
The parties at the Fifth Review Conference need to address all the weaknesses of the 
Convention. I understand that strengthening the regime will not be easy. Some member 
states believe that it is in their best interest to have biological and toxin weapons and the 
ready capability to defend against them. I believe that the strengthening of the biological 
weapons regime will help create a~ international norm against the possession and use of 
biological and toxin weapons. This norm could promote universal adherence to the 
provisions of the Gonvention through influencing the behaviour of actors in the 
international community. The reality is that universal adherence to the provisions has not 
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occurred and rogue states and terrorist organisations could develop and use these 
weapons. 
II. Correcting the Ambiguities of the Text 
The ambiguous nature of the text of the Biological Weapons Convention has been 
one of the key factors undermining its effectiveness. In order to strengthen the 
Convention, member states should adapt components from the 1993 Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC) which is the strictest arms control agreement ever negotiated 
(Robinson et al. 705). One of the elements in the CWC that lends specification to the text 
is a strong general purpose criterion where "not the objects themselves, but certain 
purposes to which they may be employed, are prohibited" (Rotfeld 6). To do this the 
Convention provides definitions of key terms in the text to limit the ambiguity of the 
main provisions, including agreed upon definitions of "chemical weapons", "toxic 
chemical", "precursor" and "purposes not prohibited under this Convention". In order to 
strengthen the general purpose criterion set out in Article I of the Biological Weapons 
Convention, biological or toxin agents or precursors intended for offensive purposes 
should be prohibited, as well as munitions, devices or equipment specifically designed to 
be used with them. As well, the Convention should prohibit any future agent or 
technology that is discovered or created that does not have justification for peaceful 
applications to ensure that novel agents and technologies are banned for possession as 
weapons. Agreed upon definitions of "bacteriological/biological agents", "toxin agents", 
"precursors", "protective", "prophylactic" and "other peaceful purposes" should be 
included to close some of the existing loopholes of the BWC. 
According to Rotfeld, the key advantage in having a general purpose criterion that 
defines the scope of legal and illegal activities and agents is that the Convention would 
not be restricted to compounds that are explicitly listed in it. Rather, the discovery of a 
new potential biological warfare agent will not undermine the effectiveness of the 
Convention because such an agent will be automatically banned if it has no justifiable 
peaceful, prophylactic or protective purpose (Rotfeld 6). This would ensure that novel 
agents in this category created by genetic engineering or those biological or toxin agents 
that are genetically altered to be more lethal or hardy to environmental conditions will be 
automatically banned. 
Pursuant to eliminating the ambiguities of the text of the Biological Weapons 
Convention, the word "use" should be inserted into the title of the Convention and Article 
I should be amended. Furthermore, a new provision should be added to Article I that 
specifically bans all use of biological and toxin weapons. All use of these weapons would 
include both first use and retaliatory use. 
III. Regulating Research for Defensive Purposes 
The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention bans member states from possessing 
biological and toxin agents except for research for defensive purposes. Article I and 
Article II of the Convention provide the legal loophole that permits research by member 
states on biological and toxin agents in order to defend against a possible attack with a 
biological weapon. Since the Biological Weapons Convention was signed in 1972, many 
member states have pursued biological and toxin research that could be used for both 
offensive or defensive purposes, including the United States, the Soviet Union, the 
72 
United Kingdom, France and Iraq. The Soviet Union created an advanced offensive 
weapons programme under the guise of a defensive research programme, experimenting 
with biological and toxin agents to make them resistant to known vaccines. 
It would be almost impossible to ban completely research on biological and toxin 
agents for defensive purposes because doing so would limit the ability of member states 
to defend themselves against attack with a biological or toxin weapon. However, at the 
Fifth Review Conference to be held in 2001, it would be prudent of the member states of 
the Convention to add measures to the text to regulate the use of biological and toxin 
agents for defensive research. In order to do so, the terms "protective", "prophylactic", 
and "other peaceful purposes" need to be narrowly defined in Article I and Article II of 
the Convention to restrict the scope of activity permitted under the guise of defensive 
research. Through restricting the scope of permissible activity, it may be more difficult 
for member states to pursue defensive research that could be converted into offensive 
weapons development. 
To regulate research the parties should incorporate into Article I a comprehensive 
list of restricted agents, including all bacteria, virus and toxins that have the potential to 
be used for offensive weapons programmes. As well, a list of all restricted dual-use 
equipment should be included to broaden the scope of the Convention. Examples of dual-
use equipment that could be restricted for import/export control include fermentors with a 
capacity greater than 300 litres, cross-flow filtration equipment equal to or greater than 5 
square metres and capable of in-situ sterilisation and aerosol inhalation chambers with a 
capacity greater than 1 cubic metre (Australia Group 1-2).1f the general purpose criterion 
in Article I were to be expanded to include definitions and a listing of all restricted 
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agents, resources and equipment used in the creation of offensive biological weapons, 
then the spectrum of activity prohibited by the Convention would be clarified. 
Furthermore, member states should create import/export controls to monitor restricted 
agents and equipment. This would regulate defensive research and therefore strengthen 
the Convention. 
To further limit the possibility of member states pursuing illegal activity under the 
guise of research for defensive purposes, a variety of verification measures should be 
added to the text. These will be discussed at greater length further on in this chapter 
under verification. A review process relating to defensive activities should also be added 
to the Convention. The review process would include yearly reports of all activities 
undertaken at the research facilities, as well as a list of all biological and toxin agents 
which parties are conducting research on. Pursuant to the declarations, civilian and 
military biological centres should submit monthly reports on what biological agents were 
sold, or were to be sold, to what facilities. This would allow the tracking and monitoring 
of lethal micro-organisms, at least to member states of the Convention. Finally, annual 
inspections of all declared civilian and military research facilities should be undertaken. 
In the next section under verification, a proposal for the creation of an Executive 
Committee to oversee the implementation of all verification controls will be discussed, as 
well as of a Technical Secretariat, which will be in charge of all inspections. 
IV. Verification: Monitoring Compliance 
Throughout the four review conferences that have been held since the entry into 
force of the Biological Weapons Convention, member states have discussed how to 
strengthen the verification provisions Article V and Article VI. The lack of strong 
verification provisions in the BWC have been one of the factors undermining the 
effectiveness of the Convention. If the BWC does not provide verification measures to 
monitor compliance of the member states with its provisions, it is unlikely that states will 
be deterred from pursuing illegal activity, including the creation of offensive biological 
weapons programmes. 
In order to envisage a body that can oversee the verification measures of the 
Biological Weapons Convention, the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention provides a 
model. The CWC mandated that a Technical Secretariat under the auspices of an 
Executive Council be created representative of the five regional blocs (Africa, Asia, 
Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, Western European and other States). 
The main responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat are to organise and co-ordinate 
verification activities through a team of inspectors staffed by nationals of member states 
(Rotfeld 11 ). 
In order to implement verification provisions in the Biological Weapons 
Convention, parties should similarly create an Executive Council of member states, 
which will oversee a Technical Secretariat. The Executive Council will take the place of 
the Security Council to oversee the cooperation of parties and to act upon all complaints 
of non-compliance. Under the direction of the Executive Council, the Technical 
Secretariat will implement the verification measures agreed upon by member states and 
will monitor compliance with these provisions. Inspectors from member states will staff 
the Technical Secretariat. Because of the intrusive nature of verifying compliance, the 
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selected number of individuals comprising the inspection team will be representative of 
the membership and will serve for five years . 
In order to help deter parties from pursuing illegal activity, a comprehensive set of 
verification provisions needs to be added to the text of the Convention in the near future. 
Verification of compliance requires the monitoring of all parties' activities involving 
biological agents and of the possession of any amount of such agents (Rosenburg and 
Burck 304). Verification alone will not stop member states from pursuing offensive 
biological weapons programmes, but it has proven effective in other regimes, such as the 
Intermediate Nuclear Forces Agreement (INF). 
In order to monitor all activities involving biological and toxin agents, the 
following measures should be added to the Convention at the Fifth Review Conference: 
(1) Member states should make annual declarations to the Technical Secretariat on 
their progress with the destruction of existing stockpiles to ensure compliance 
with Article II. 
(2) Member states should make annual declarations to the Technical Secretariat of 
activities of all facilities that work with delivery systems, disease vectors, vaccine 
creation and all civilian and military facilities with Bio-Level 3 and 4 facilities 
including biotechnology firms and pharmaceutical companies. 
(3) All imports and exports of dual-use equipment by parties to the Convention 
through national export controls should be monitored. Partit:s will submit monthly 
statements to the Technical Secretariat on all dual-use commodities that they 
imported or exported. 
(4) All sales and transfers of all biological and toxin cultures and the precursors 
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should be monitored. Member states, working in tandem with civilian firms, will 
submit monthly statements on all biological and toxin cultures and their 
precursors that they imported or exported to the Technical Secretariat. 
(5) Exchange visits of scientific and military personnel to defensive facilities to 
increase transparency among member states should be promoted. 
(6) Compliance of member states should be monitored through the use of national 
technical means, including surveillance by aircraft and satellite. 
(7) The activities at defensive facilities should be monitored with on-site instruments 
including cameras and radar equipment which would be put in place by the 
Technical Secretariat. 
(8) Yearly on-site inspections of all facilities should take place. Permissible activities 
at on-site inspections would include visual inspections, interviewing personnel, 
auditing of files and documents, and the sampling and identification of all agents. 
(9) Challenge inspections with due cause should be sanctioned. Permissible activities 
during challenge on-site inspections would include visual inspections, 
interviewing personnel, auditing of files and documents and the sampling and 
identification of all agents. 
The implementation of verification provisions are instrumental to the effectiveness of the 
biological weapons regime because effective verification deters parties from pursuing 
illegal activity, including the creation of offensive biological and toxin weapons 
programmes. 
It has been suggested by Scharf that enforcement of the provisions of the 
Biological Weapons Convention should be undertaken by the Security Council, which 
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may call upon United Nations members to impose sanctions or threaten the use of force 
to ensure compliance with the Convention. Along with measures taken by the Security 
Council, offenders should be prosecuted before international criminal tribunals (Scharf 
485). I believe, however, that enforcement of the provisions of the Biological Weapons 
Convention should be under the auspices of an Executive Council. Within the Executive 
Council, member states could decide collectively on enforcement measures. Member 
states could agree within the Executive Council to sanction offenders or to other methods 
of reprisal. The use of remedial action against parties guilty of illegally pursuing 
biological weapons programmes will act to enforce compliance with the provisions of the 
Biological Weapons Convention through fear of reprisal. The addition of verification 
provisions to the text of the Convention and the threat of reprisal against illegal action 
may deter states from pursuing offensive biological and toxin weapons programmes. If 
member states nevertheless pursue such weapons programmes, the inevitable dilemma 
arises as to whether it is better to have the offending party a member of the Convention, 
or if it is better to expel it. If member states continue to pursue offensive biological and 
toxin weapons capabilities, they should not be removed from the Convention. If they are 
outside of the BWC they will be able to pursue offensive weapons capabilities 
unhindered. However, if they remain parties to the Convention, the Executive Council 
and member states can more easily attempt to constrain their illegal activity. 
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V. Provisions to Regulate Advances in Biotechnology 
Advances in biotechnology since the early 1980s have allowed scientists to 
genetically alter existing biological and toxin agents to make them more lethal, hardy to 
environmental conditions and resistant to known vaccines and anti-serums. As well, these 
advances have allowed the creation of novel agents that can overcome all existing human 
and target immuno-defences. After the conclusion of the First Review Conference, 
member states recognised the potential threat to the effectiveness of the Convention from 
biotechnology. However, by the conclusion of the Fourth Review Conference in 1996, 
only minor changes had been made to the BWC to regulate the biotechnology industry. 
While it will be difficult to regulate this industry without restricting the economic and 
technological communities of member states, such regulation is necessary to strengthen 
the Convention. 
Amendments to the general purpose criterion should be made to prohibit the use 
of any new technologies for offensive weapons purposes. The addition of a list of dual-
use equipment that should be monitored will further help regulate the biotechnology 
industry, with import and export controls and, assuming verification provisions are 
instituted, the Technical Secretariat will be able to monitor all transfers of dual-use 
equipment. This process will help to control illegal activity. 
The creation of all new biological and toxin agents will have to be prohibited 
under the Convention unless they have justification for protective, prophylactic and other 
protective purposes. Member states should submit a report to the Technical Secretariat 
describing their research with the new agent. This process will help ensure that member 
states do not create novel agents for defensive purposes with the intention of using them 
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for illegal activity. Pursuant to the implementation of the verification provisions, both the 
military and civilian biotechnology industries should be required to submit annual reports 
to the Technical Secretariat of all their activities with existing biological and toxin agents, 
their precursors, novel agents and all dual-use equipment. As well, annual declarations of 
activities of all facilities that work with delivery systems, disease vectors, vaccine 
creation and all civilian and military facilities with Bio-Level 3 and 4 labs, including 
pharmaceutical companies should be made to the Technical Secretariat on an annual 
basis. If parties do not comply with these measures, the Executive Council may take 
remedial action to enforce compliance, including sanctions and the threat of force. 
VI. Conclusion 
A considerable obstacle facing proponents of a strengthened Convention at the 
Fifth Review Conference is the predominance of realist power politics. Some states in the 
international community still subscribe to the doctrines of deterrence and security 
through armament. They do not believe that the weapons of war contribute to its 
occurrence. In order for these states to accept a strengthened Convention, other member 
states must lead through action. Ideally, these states eventually will realise that the 
existence of biological and toxin weapons is a common problem and that cooperation is 
imperative to halt states and terrorist organisations from possessing and using these 
deadly weapons. 
The success of the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993 has shown that states 
in the international community are willing to cooperate to ban weapons of mass 
destruction. Many of the states that are parties to the CWC are also parties to the 
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Biological Weapons Convention. It is hoped that these parties will recognise the urgency 
that is needed to address the proliferation of biological and toxin weapons and will make 
the changes necessary at the Fifth Review Conference. In order to strengthen the BWC, 
member states should consider the sort of additions to the Convention proposed here. 
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Chapter Seven: Future Considerations 
For hundreds of years biological and toxin agents have been used as weapons on 
the battlefield and as instruments of terrorism. In modem times they have been classified 
as weapons of mass destruction for their capability to inflict high casualties in human and 
animal targets. The presence of biological and toxin agents in arsenals around the world 
now threatens humanity. Coupled with the threat of these deadly agents being used in 
warfare is the potential for them to be used as tools of terrorism. Exacerbating this threat 
is the very nature of the weapon. Biological and toxin agents are easy and inexpensive 
weapons to create and use in comparison to conventional weapons. They are easy to 
disguise and in small amounts can kill thousands of people and animals. 
Recognising the threat that these agents pose.' states from around the world in 
1972 signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction 
in an effort to ban possession of biological and toxin agents. In fact, the Convention does 
not prevent the developing, producing and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons. 
This failure is the result of many factors , including the ambiguous nature of the 
Convention, the allowance of biological and toxin weapons for research for defensive 
purposes, a lack of verification controls and a lack of provisions in the text to regulate 
advances in the biotechnology industry. Many states seem to believe that it is in their best 
interest to pursue offensive or defensive weapons programmes. 
The future of the Biological Weapons Convention thus is uncertain. More states 
than ever possess the technology and scientific know how to create offensive biological 
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and toxin agents. Heading into the Fifth Review Conference in 2001, the member states 
can either agree to make modest changes to the Convention or can initiate major reforms 
with the objective of strengthening the Convention. The first choice that member states 
have is to continue on with the slow and piecemeal negotiations that have characterised 
the first four review conferences. Eventually member states may arrive at some 
agreement on the implementation of verification and other measures. More than likely, if 
negotiations continue on at the same slow pace, both member states and non-member 
states will pursue offensive biological weapons programmes, forcing an arms spiral 
which will ultimately see the failure of the Convention and the effort to ban biological 
and toxin agents as weapons. If horizontal and vertical proliferation continues, the 
Convention may fall into disuse because it will be grossly ineffectual, or, in a worst case 
scenario, the Convention will be suspended in a state of war. 
A second option facing member states at the Fifth Review Conference and beyond 
is to agree to implement major reforms to the Convention to make it as comprehensive 
and as strict as possible. As argued in the previous chapter, at the Fifth Review 
Conference parties should include "use" in the title and a new provision in Article I; 
should define key terminology, including "protective", "prophylactic" and "other 
peaceful purposes"; should incorporate lists of restricted agents and dual-use equipment 
into the text of the Convention; should restrict defensive research; should regulate, 
control and monitor the biotechnology industry; and should institute a series of 
comprehensive verification controls. While there are no guarantees that a strengthened 
Convention will be successful in banning biological and toxin weapons, it should help 
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create an international norm that will change states' conceptions of permissible biological 
and toxin weapons activity. 
It is impossible to deny that even with a strengthened Biological Weapons 
Convention the potential for illegal activity still exists. If states and other actors believe it 
is in their best interest to pursue offensive biological and toxin weapons programmes in 
direct contravention to the Convention, the threat of discovery and potential remedial 
action by other member states may not be a sufficient threat to deter them from this 
illegal activity. Furthermore, member states may pursue defensive capabilities so that 
they retain the ability to retaliate offensively against an attack with a biological or toxin 
weapon. Even if member states comply with the provisions outlined in the Biological 
Weapons Convention, a threat to global security exists from rogue states that have not 
become parties to the Convention and from terrorist organisations. 
The aim of this thesis was to demonstrate that the existing Biological Weapons 
Convention has not been successful in reaching its goals to ban biological and toxin 
weapons. Member states of the Convention, including Iraq and the Russian Federation, 
have developed and stockpiled offensive biological and toxin weapons. Terrorist 
organisations have used or developed biological and toxin weapons, including the Aum 
Shinrikyo in Japan, which also studied the properties of ebola for use as a weapon. 
Through offering suggestions on how to strengthen the Convention, my goal has been to 
demonstrate that there are options available to states to make amendments to the 
Convention to ban these deadly weapons. 
The theoretical value of this thesis is that it demonstrates that a change in the 
status quo of the Biological Weapons Convention must be achieved if the regime is to be 
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strengthened. An international norm that bans the possession and use of biological 
weapons will challenge the realist notion of state dominance in the international system. 
If the realist vision of security is challenged, the idealist paradigm, which supports the 
proposition that the role of arms in the international system is basically negative, could 
achieve greater dominance in international affairs and the importance of controlling arms 
and weapons systems could be further recognised. 
The Biological Weapons Convention was negotiated during the Cold War when 
states in the international system subscribed to the belief that deterrence and the build-up 
of armaments would protect national security. Due to the political climate of the Cold 
War, that decreed that states relied upon their own military capabilities and those of their 
allies to defend against an attack, the few multilateral arms control agreements that were 
negotiated were riddled with loopholes to ensure no restriction in the development or use 
of weapons. The end of the Cold War has not shown a marked change in power politics 
among states. Many states in the international system still subscribe to the principle of 
security through arms and believe that weapons of mass destruction are needed to deter 
potential aggressors from attacking. This said, the successes of the 1987 Intermediate 
Nuclear Forces Treaty and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention demonstrate that 
states are willing to create strict arms control agreements. 
Proponents of a strengthened BWC assume that if states have these weapons of 
war, they may use them and set off a catastrophic chain of events that, in a worst case 
scenario, could start a Third World War. In order to help stop states and terrorist 
organisations from possessing these deadly weapons, an international norm that bans 
possession and use of these weapons should be created that, like the norm against the use 
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of nuclear weapons, creates a belief that it is not only irrational but also abhorrent to use 
biological and toxin weapons. The process of norm building is an integral component of 
effective international arms control agreements. If states come to the common belief that 
the possession and use of biological and toxin weapons is abhorrent in nature and that 
strict regulations need to be placed on state and non-state activity then, in theory, a 
strengthened agreement on the ban of these weapons can and will be created. The harsh 
truth is that if member states do not strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention, the 
pervasive threat of an attack with a biological or toxin weapon may more easily become a 
reality. 
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Appendix 1 
Ratifications to the BTWC 
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention was signed at London, Moscow and 
Washington DC, 10 April1972 and entered into force 26 March 1975. 
Total number of ratifications and accessions: 144 
There are 18 signatories which have yet to ratify the Convention. 
Alphabetical order: 
• Afghanistan signed 10-04-72 and ratified 26-03-7 5 
• Albania acceded 03-06-92 
• Argentina signed 01-08-72 and ratified 27-11-79 
• Armenia acceded 07-06-94 
• Australia signed 10-04-72 and ratified 05-10-77 
• Austria signed 10-04-72 and ratified 10-08-73 
• Bahamas acceded 26-11-86 
• Bahrain acceded 28-10-88 
• Bangladesh acceded11-03-85 
• Barbados signed 16-02-73 and ratified 16-02-73 
• Belarus signed 10-04-72 and ratified 26-03-75 
• Belgium signed 10-04-72 and ratified 15-03-79 
• Belize acceded 20-10-86 
• Benin signed 10-04-72 and ratified 25-04-7 5 
• Bhutan acceded 08-06-78 
• Bolivia signed 10-04-72 and ratified 30-10-7 5 
• Bosnia and Herzegovina acceded 15-08-94 
• Botswana signed 10-04-72 and ratified 05-02-92 
• Brazil signed 10-04-72 and ratified 27-02-73 
• Brunei Darussalam acceded 31-01-91 
• Bulgaria signed 10-04-72 and ratified 02-08-72 
• Burkina Faso acceded 17-04-91 
• Cambodia signed 10-04-72 and ratified 09-03-83 
• Canada signed 10-04-72 and ratified 18-09-72 
• Cape Verde acceded 20-10-77 
• Chile signed 10-04-72 and ratified 22-04-80 
• China acceded 15-11-84 
• Colombia signed 10-04-72 and ratified 19-12-83 
• Congo (Brazzaville) acceded 23-10-78 
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• Congo (Democratic Republic of the, formerly Zaire) signed 10-04-72 and 
ratified 16-09-75 
• Costa Rica signed 10-04-72 and ratified 17-12-73 
• Croatia acceded 28-04-93 
• Cuba signed 10-04-72 and ratified 21-04-76 
• Cyprus signed 10-04-72 and ratified 06-11-73 
• Czech Republic acceded 05-04-93 
• Denmark signed 10-04-72 and ratified 01-03-73 
• Dominica acceded 08-11-78 
• Dominican Republic signed 10-04-72 and ratified 23-02-73 
• Ecuador signed 14-06-72 and ratified 21-03-75 
• El Salvador signed 10-04-72 and ratified 31-12-91 
• Equatorial Guinea acceded 16-01-89 
• Estonia acceded 21-06-93 
• Ethiopia signed 10-04-72 and ratified 26-05-75 
• Fiji signed 22-02-73 and ratified 04-09-73 
• Finland signed 10-04-72 and ratified 04-02-74 
• France acceded 27-09-84 
• Gambia signed 02-06-72 and ratified 21-11-91 
• Georgia acceded 22-05-96 
• Germany signed 10-04-72 and ratified 28-11-72 
• Ghana signed 10-04-72 and ratified 06-06-75 
• Greece signed 10-04-72 and ratified 10-12-75 
• Grenada acceded 22-10-86 
• Guatemala signed 09-05-72 and ratified 19-09-73 
• Guinea-Bissau acceded 20-08-76 
• Honduras signed 10-04-72 and ratified 14-03-79 
• Hungary signed 10-04-72 and ratified 27-12-72 
• Iceland signed 10-04-72 and ratified 15-02-73 
• India signed 15-01-73 and ratified 15-07-74 
• Indonesia signed 20-06-72 and ratified 19-02-92 
• Iran signed 10-04-72 and ratified 22-08-73 
• Iraq signed 11-05-72 and ratified 19-06-91 
• Ireland signed 10-04-72 and ratified 27-10-72 
• Italy signed 10-04-72 and ratified 30-05-75 
• Jamaica acceded 13-08-75 
• Japan signed 10-04-72 and ratified 08-06-82 
93 
• Jordan signed 10-04-72 and ratified 30-05-75 
• Kenya acceded 07-01-76 
• Korea, Democratic People's Republic of (North Korea) acceded 13-03-87 
• Korea, Republic of (South Korea) signed 10-04-72 and ratified 25-06-87 
• Kuwait signed 14-04-72 and ratified 18-07-72 
• Lao People's Democratic Republic signed 10-04-72 and ratified 20-03-73 
• Latvia acceded 06-02-97 
• Lebanon signed 10-04-72 and ratified 26-03-75 
• Lesotho signed 10-04-72 and ratified 06-09-77 
• Libya acceded 19-01-82 
• Liechtenstein acceded 30-05-91 
• Lithuania acceded 10-02-98 
• Luxembourg signed 10-04-72 and ratified 23-03-76 
• Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic of) acceded 24-12-96 
• Malaysia signed 10-04-72 and ratified 06-09-91 
• Maldives acceded 02-08-93 
• Malta signed 11-09-72 and ratified 07-04-75 
• Mauritius signed 10-04-72 and ratified 07-08-72 
• Mexico signed 10-04-72 and ratified 08-04-7 4 
• Monaco acceded 30-04-99 
• Mongolia signed 10-04-72 and ratified 05-09-72 
• Netherlands signed 10-04-72 and ratified 22-06-81 
• New Zealand signed 10-04-72 and ratified 13-12-72 
• Nicaragua signed 10-04-72 and ratified 07-08-75 
• Niger signed 21-04-72 and ratified 23-06-72 
• Nigeria signed 03-07-72 and ratified 03-07-73 
• Norway signed 10-04-72 and ratified 01-08-73 
• Oman acceded 31-03-92 
• Pakistan signed 10-04-72 and ratified 25-09-7 4 
• Panama signed 02-05-72 and ratified 20-03-74 
• Papua New Guinea acceded 27-10-80 
• Paraguay acceded 09-06-7 6 
• Peru signed 10-04-72 and ratified 05-06-85 
• Philippines signed 10-04-72 and ratified 21-05-73 
• Poland signed 10-04-72 and ratified 25-01-73 
• Portugal signed 29-06-72 and ratified 15-05-75 
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• Qatar signed 14-11-72 and ratified 17-04-75 
• Romania signed 10-04-72 and ratified 25-07-79 
• Russian Federation signed 10-04-72 and ratified 26-03-75 
• Rwanda signed 10-04-72 and ratified 20-05-75 
• Saint Kitts (Christopher) and Nevis acceded 02-04-91 
• Saint Lucia acceded 26-11-86 
• Saint Vincent and the Grenadines acceded 13-05-99 
• San Marino signed 12-09-72 and ratified 11-03-75 
• Sao Tome and Principe acceded 24-08-79 
• Saudi Arabia signed 12-04-72 and ratified 24-05-72 
• Senegal signed 10-04-72 and ratified 26-03-75 
• Serbia and Montenegro signed 10-04-72 and ratified 25-10-73 
• Seychelles acceded 11-10-79 
• Sierra Leone signed 07-11-72 and ratified 29-06-76 
• Singapore signed 19-06-72 and ratified 02-12-75 
• Slovakia acceded 17-05-93 
• Slovenia acceded 07-04-92 
• Solomon Islands acceded 17-06-81 
• South Africa signed 10-04-72 and ratified 03-11-75 
• Spain signed 10-04-72 and ratified 20-06-79 
• Sri Lanka signed 10-04-72 and ratified 18-11-86 
• Suriname acceded 06-01-93 
• Swaziland acceded 18-06-91 
• Sweden signed 27-02-75 and ratified 05-02-76 
• Switzerland signed 10-04-72 and ratified 04-05-76 
• Taiwan (not officially recognised as an independent state by the United Nations) 
signed 10-04-72 and ratified 09-02-73 
• Thailand signed 17-01-73 and ratified 28-05-75 
• Togo signed 10-04-72 and ratified 10-11-76 
• Tonga acceded 28-09-76 
• Tunisia 10-04-72 and ratified 18-05-73 
• Turkey 10-04-72 and ratified 25-10-74 
• Turkmenistan accededll-01-96 
• Uganda acceded 12-05-92 
• Ukraine signed 10-04-72 and ratified 26-03-7 5 
• United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland signed 10-04-72 and 
ratified 26-03-75 
• United States of America signed 10-04-72 and ratified 26-03-75 
• Uruguay acceded 06-04-81 
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• Uzbekistan acceded 11-01-96 
• Vanuatu acceded 12-10-90 
• Venezuela signed 10-04-72 and ratified 18-10-78 
• VietNam acceded 20-06-80 
• Yemen signed 26-04-72 and ratified 01-06-79 
• Zimbabwe acceded 05-11-90 
SIPRI: Ratifications to the BTWC. 1999. 10 Dec. 1999. 
<http:/ /projects. si pri.se/ cbw/docs/bw-btwc-rat. h tml>. 
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Appendix II 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. 
Signed at London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April1972. 
Entered into force on 26 March 1975 
Depositaries: U.K., U.S. and Soviet governments. 
The States Parties to this Convention, 
Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and 
complete disarmament, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons 
of mass destruction, and convinced that the prohibition of the development, production 
and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and their 
elimination, through effective measures, will facilitate the achievement of general and 
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, 
Recognizing the important significance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in 
War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of 
Warfare, signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925, and conscious also of the contribution 
which the said Protocol has already made, and continues to make, to mitigating the 
horrors of war, 
Reaffirming their adherence to the principles and objectives of that Protocol and calling 
upon all States to comply strictly with them, 
Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly condemned all 
actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of June 17, 1925, 
Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of confidence between peoples and the general 
improvement of the international atmosphere, 
Desiring also to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations, 
Convinced of the importance and urgency of eliminating from the arsenals of States, 
through effective measures, such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as those using 
chemical or bacteriological (biological) agents, 
Recognizing that an agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological)and toxin 
weapons represents a first possible step towards the achievement of agreement on 
effective measures also for the prohibition of the development, production and 
stockpiling of chemical weapons, and determined to continue negotiations to that end, 
Determined for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of 
bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons, 
Convinced that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that no 
effort should be spared to minimize this risk, 
Have agreed as follows: 
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Article I 
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, 
produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: 
(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of 
production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, 
protective or other peaceful purposes; 
(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for 
hostile purposes or in armed conflict. 
Article II 
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy, or to divert to peaceful 
purposes, as soon as possible but not later than nine months after entry into force of the 
Convention, all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in 
article I of the Convention, which are in its possession or under its jurisdiction or control. 
In implementing the provisions of this article all necessary safety precautions shall be 
observed to protect populations and the environment. 
Article III 
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient 
whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any 
State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire 
any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in article I 
of this Convention. 
Article IV 
Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, 
take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, 
stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means 
of delivery specified in article I of the Convention, within the territory of such State, 
under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere. 
Article V 
The States Parties to this Convention undertake to consult one another and to cooperate in 
solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application 
of the provisions of, the Convention. Consultation and Cooperation pursuant to this 
article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the 
framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. 
Article VI 
(1) Any State Party to this convention which finds that any other State Party is acting in 
breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a 
complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should 
include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its 
consideration by the Security Council. 
(2) Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to cooperate in carrying out any 
investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions 
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of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the 
Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Convention of the 
results of the investigation. 
Article VII 
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in 
accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any Party to the Convention which so 
requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been exposed to danger as a 
result of violation of the Convention. 
Article VIII 
Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from 
the obligations assumed by any State under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in 
War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of 
Warfare, signed at Geneva on June17, 1925. 
Article IX 
Each State Party to this Convention affirms the recognized objective of effective 
prohibition of chemical weapons and, to this end, undertakes to continue negotiations in 
good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the 
prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and for their destruction, 
and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically 
designed for the production or use of chemical agents for weapons purposes. 
Article X 
(1) The States Parties to this Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to 
participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and 
technological information for the use of bacteriological(biological) agents and toxins for 
peaceful purposes. Parties to the Convention in a position to do so shall also cooperate in 
contributing individually or together with other States or international organizations to 
the further development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of 
bacteriology(biology) for prevention of disease, or for other peaceful purposes. 
(2) This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the 
economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or 
international cooperation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological)activities, 
including the international exchange of bacteriological (biological)and toxins and 
equipment for the processing, use or production of bacteriological(biological) agents and 
toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. 
Article XI 
Any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Amendments shall enter 
into force for each State Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a 
majority of the States Parties to the Convention and there after for each remaining State 
Party on the date of acceptance by it. 
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Article XII 
Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, or earlier if it is requested by a 
majority of Parties to the Convention by submitting a proposal to this effect to the 
Depositary Governments, a conference of States Parties to the Convention shall be held at 
Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of the Convention, with a view to assuring 
that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including the 
provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being realized. Such 
review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments 
relevant to the Convention. 
Article XIII 
(1) This Convention shall be of unlimited duration. 
(2) Each State Party to this Convention shall in exercising its national sovereignty have 
the right to withdraw from the Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related 
to the subject matter of the Convention, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its 
country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties to the 
Convention and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such 
notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having 
jeopardized its supreme interests. 
Article XIV 
(1) This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not 
sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph (3) of this 
Article may accede to it at any time. 
(2) This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of 
ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the 
United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary 
Governments. 
(3) This Convention shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification 
by twenty-two Governments, including the Governments designated as Depositaries of 
the Convention. 
(4) For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to 
the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit 
of their instruments of ratification or accession. 
(5) The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States 
of the date of each signature, the date of deposit or each instrument of ratification or of 
accession and the date of entry into force of this Convention, and of the receipt of other 
notices. 
(6) This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to 
Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
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Article XV 
This Convention, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are 
equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly 
certified copies of the Convention shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to 
the Governments of the signatory and acceding states. 
University of Bradford: Text of the Biological Weapons Convention. 1998. 04 August 
2000. <http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/keytext/textcon.html>. 
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